Independent Evaluation of the International Trade Centre (ITC)

Final Report

Annex VII

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ANNEX VII: Comments from stakeholders and evaluation team responses May 2014

This is a compilation of the 239 comments and questions received on the draft Evaluation report from all stakeholders to whom it was sent by the ITC Evaluation Unit (EMU) all of whom will also receive this compilation. All comments have been painstakingly examined by the Evaluation Team and responses are given to each one, noting as well whether any revisions have been made in the Final Report, or if not why not. As agreed in the terms of this Evaluation, EMU in turn will ensure that the Team has given full consideration and response to substantive comments received. Please note that the paragraph references are to the original draft report paragraph numbers, which will not coincide with the numbers in the Final Report because of additions and other changes. For the main report the relevant paragraphs in the Final Report have been indicated in a { } bracket, after the number in the draft report. This has not been done for the paragraph references in the Executive Summary -"ES"- which has been more extensively revised, but relevant changes in the revised text can still be traced.

No	Org	Para	Comment	Team Response/Action
1	ITC	ES General	According to the TOR, the Executive Summary should conform to the ITC Guidelines for Evaluation Reports (found at: http://www.intracen.org/itc/about/how-itc-works/evaluation/). A summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations should be provided.	The Executive Summary has been revised to conform to the guidelines, with the agreement of the evaluation manager that some standard requirements, e.g. on maximum length, are modified to reflect the scope of this Evaluation.
2	ITC	ES General	Many questions arise when reading the Executive Summary, but are answered in the text. It should be more evident that certain statements in the summary are backed by findings stated in the draft report. For example, para ES8 "...those who know ITC's work are relatively few and scattered, because that is how its activities have been as well" on its own this statement is unsubstantiated and is not clarified until reading the draft report. In para ES18 it states "...significant progress since 2006, but from a very low base at that time"; how is the reference "low base" substantiated?	Clearly it is in the very nature and purpose of an executive summary to pull out key points for which the detailed rationale and evidence is spelled out in the main body. It could be a problem if there were points not substantiated in the main text, but that has not been suggested. For information, the "low base" in 2006 is d derived from the Joint Evaluation of that year.
3	Canada	ES General	The Exec Summary differs from full review in its treatment of ITC's management of risks: the ExSum hardly mentions that ITC does any risk management; while the full draft suggests ITC does, but could do more.	The revised Executive Summary does not go into these specific aspects in the same way, though this issue is noted in the Summary Table, and the treatment is refined in the main Report text.

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4	Canada	ES General	The ExSum with its ratings tables also comes across as more blunt, without the explanation and nuances of the full report.	As noted as well in other responses, all the summary tables and ratings in the draft report were introduced in order to bring together for the users of the results a manageable and clear set of assessments across the many fronts in this comprehensive Evaluation. Providing ratings is a way to way to further distil the assessments, but increases the risk of over-simplifying them for readers, and must therefore be handled with care. As the comment suggests, this risk is possibly magnified in an executive summary, when some readers may go no more deeply into the Report, but take away more simplified impressions than are justified. The Team has therefore decided to leave the ratings tables themselves out of the Executive Summary, while summarizing their main findings and recognising that readers will have to work harder to gain a coherent picture of the results across the Evaluation questions. Even in the main text of the Final Report, it should be noted, two more tenuous ratings tables have been eliminated, all remaining ratings have been re-checked, validated or revised , and properly contextualized and labelled. As one important example, the progress rating of "some progress" has clearly been interpreted as grudging, which it was not. The "some" (which anyway did not add any precision) has been removed. "Progress" also includes a very wide range of advancement on the many different fronts involved, short of the category of "major progress", but the detailed text provides the more specific readings and supporting evidence. In interpreting this scale it is important to reiterate that it also allowed for the possibilities of regression and major regression, neither of which was found to apply to any issue in ITC's case over the period.
5	WTO	ES 2.1	On motivation it is important to note the high score in terms of vision and mission while at the same time little to no change in terms of culture and incentives which confirms some informal feedback we had on staff motivation and morale.	Yes, although the picture emerging from the staff survey results in the "professional development" area from 2014 are more positive than in 2012 there is obviously a need for further progress to match the commitment of staff to a shared vision and mission.
6	ITC	ES3		Inserted "all": but above all useful
7	ITC	ES4		Replaced "by those who must ultimately devide" with " by ITC governors and senior management"
8	ITC	ES6	"…unusual, explicit ratings" clarify the use of the word "unusual".	These are "unusual" in that most evaluations or other reports do not account so directly for the strength or weakness of their evidence on particular points. This should be a major strength in helping readers to interpret and use the results.

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9	ITC	ES9	The evaluation would benefit from a deeper discussion on the specific strengths and weaknesses in ITC's products and services to guide future strategy. Also, regarding "…ITC's five announced strategic objectives…", only during the 2006-2007 biennium there were a total of five strategic objectives (see Proposed Programme Budget A/60/6), for all remaining biennia there were only three strategic objectives (see Proposed Programme Budgets A/62/6, A/64/6, and A/66/6).	The Evaluation could conceivably have been organized around the products and services, but the choice was agreed in the Inception Report not to do so, but instead to sample whole country portfolios. This has had the benefit of objectively assessing a wide range of products and services in different settings and sometime in combinations in response to particular country situations. There is no full catalogue of ITC's different products and services and there would not a rigorous basis for attempting to "rate" them individually, with the partial exception of some of the "global public goods" products where their market position, demand and use, and cost are more easily established (and this has been done). With respect to the strategic objectives, in this paragraph "five" has been deleted, although in some other contexts there has been confusion and change over the period between formally mandated Strategic Objectives and those found in ITC's Annual Reports. It remains true that the Evaluation followed the " ITC's strategic objective areas (the "expected accomplishments" for the 2008-9 biennium have been taken as the base best reflecting changes since 2006 and remaining fairly constant since)." [Inception Report para .39.] On the other hand, the Evaluation has also given attention where appropriate to developments against the other "strategic objectives" that have been articulated in annual reports and more recent official plans.
10	ITC	ES10	Heading here should be "Products and Service Offer". Evaluator touches on resource mobilization and marketing but this would benefit from a separate heading not buried in the other points.	This comment no longer applies to the revised Executive Summary
11	ITC	ES14	There is a mismatch between the text and the ratings; the latter is much more negative than the more nuanced narrative	See response to Comment no. 8 above.
12	ITC	ES, Table 2	Project identification and design is rated as poor along with project monitoring. How were the PQAG and PAC structures taken into account? (Some positive improvement noted only). Is there a way to benchmark with other agencies on this matter?	These ratings have been carefully re-examined and somewhat revised. In fact the key criterion on our list that has led us to make revisions is that of revisiting our "benchmarking" against practice in comparable institutions and programmes. In a number of areas, including these ones, ITC's practice (including some distinctive informal and pragmatic features) make it look better by comparison. " positive change " remains a fair assessment of the PAC and (now-discontinued) PQAC innovations. Some of the general responses to the comments in comment 186 are also applicable here. Specifically: It is true that the PQAG, etc. processes have sought to improve the rigour of the design and approval processes. What is much less clear is the rationale and processes for the identification and selection of projects and countries, where the overwhelming

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				evidence is that the ITC approach has been reactive and/or improvised based on unsystematic contacts or funding possibilities. On the other hand, we stand by the evidence for more positive ratings from our sample on the ground. In fact, there is no inconsistency between the two sets of ratings, or with the Evaluation's overall conclusions and recommendations. The point here is that from a systemic perspective the fitness was still not satisfactory ("fair") for the reasons above, while our limited sample of projects was actually somewhat better, with hardly any evidence of inappropriate or poorly designed projects actually on the ground . The most plausible explanation for the more positive sample reading is a wide open demand for ITC projects and good pragmatic competence by the operational experts setting up projects.
13	WTO	ES17	Overall we can share the evaluators' sense of some positive change since 2006 but that, as the report notes should not be any cause for complacency. Room for improvement remains on the motivation, project and program management as well as enhanced networking and partnerships in A4T for example. The Report also is quite right in saying that the responsibility for improvement is also on ITCs Governors, members, supporters and Parent Organizations.	Thank you. Each of these themes is discussed and reflected in detailed responses to other comments below,
14	ITC	ES 19	Reference is made to Matrix 2, but it does not indicate where the matrix can be located. In ES12 it indicates that Matrix 1 is found in the Inception Report, however, given the importance of these matrices, both would be more helpful as an annex in the draft report rather than being annexed to the Inception Report.	Yes, it should be made easy in the final Report for those who wish to refer to the Matrices to do so In light of this comment, we considered taking it out of the Inception Report annex and making them a separate annex. On further reflection, though, we concluded that it is important to retain the integrity of the Inception Report as a whole, which introduces and explains the matrices. Thus the solution has been to signpost matrix references very clearly to the annexed matrices
15	ITC	ES22	Un-earmarked and soft-earmarked funding (Window I) have grown significantly since 2006 (see para 259 in main report). Note: In 2013 the W1/W2 split was 50/50	The title of figure 10 (and the reference in the body of the report) is corrected to "allocations" from "expenditure."" and the text adjusted as necessary.
16	WTO	ES22 , ES26	Unsurprisingly too is the disturbing nature of the lack of visibility on financial means for the work and programs of ITC. Something the evaluators highlighted in greater details, with the risk of creating some sensitivities with the donors, by challenging for example the earmarking of funds as well as the short to medium timeframe of most of the financial contributions. This is very common criticism among many A4T operators and not unique to ITC.	As noted in other responses and further clarified in the text, the Report's main thrust in this area is not simply to call for more longer-term and un-earmarked donor funding, but a more pro-active ITC programme design and support strategy in close collaboration with donors, backed up by continued confidence-building improvements in management. The need for ITC to be able to plan longer-term funding is shown to be a serious test of. donors' commitment to sustainable results from TRTA. The findings show that there are large costs, and limits, to how much shorter-term support can be patched together to achieve sustainable results.

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17	WTO	ES23 , Table 2: 2.7 , 2.8	I am also not totally convinced the report gives a clear assessment in some areas of ITCs Performance and Results since 2006, in particular regarding matrix indicators/issues number 7 and 8 where the responses range from "can't say" to "mixed" !!	These are important examples of the care taken in the Evaluation not to overclaim certainty in making overall assessments beyond what the evidence can support. Only five of the 24 ratings on changes since 2006 were classified as "can't say" and one as "mixed" . In all cases, the issues are treated in the text in ways that provide as much reliable information as possible in relation to these Evaluation questions and help show why we stop short of simplistic ratings.
18	ITC	ES, Table 3	This comment is with reference to the table that appears below para ES23. There is a significant mis-match between the assessment of "rigorous and responsive design" in section ES 3.2, table 2 (good/fair) and "project identification and design" in ES 2.1, table 2 (poor/fair). One would expect closer alignment between these two assessments.	In a number of areas, there is a distinction to be drawn between the findings and ratings on some related issues from a formal, systemic perspective in the Table on Organization and Management (based on HQ studies) and from a practical operational perspective in the Table on Performance and Results (based on our portfolio and country analyses). The two sets of results were compared in drafting to understand and validate different findings and they have been carefully reviewed in preparing the final Report taking into consideration this and other comments. After comments and careful review, two ratings have been revised, one to strengthen consistency and another was sub-divided. In this case, the assessment of "rigorous and responsive design" in the Performance and results Table 10 is actually a composite of three component ratings (good - fair - and poor/fair) rather than (good/fair) as suggested. Thus it is not far off the Organization and Management rating of poor/fair. The main difference would be attributable to the "good" rating for design responsiveness on the ground, a consideration that does not come directly into play at the systemic level . See also response for comment 186.
19	ITC	ES32	What does "using its improving management base" mean? Please clarify.	The reference to "reap(ing) substantial economies of scale by using its improving management base" is intended to emphasize that with the improvements in ITC's management, the Centre should now have a greater capacity to mount and manage programmes
20	ITC	ES34	What is the present situation which is unsustainable? Definitions/evidence. To avoid confusion, please clarify if the pronoun "it" in the third line refers to the 2006 Evaluation or the 2014 Evaluation.	This paragraph is one of the final ones in the Section entitled "Main Conclusions" and the "present situation" it refers to is clearly set out in the preceding paragraphs, especially no. 32. The detailed supporting evidence, of course, is to be found in the main text.
21	ITC	ES35	What is meant by "living rosters"?	The term "living" (with parentheses) is intended to denote much more than traditional lists maintained as an afterthought, but instead rosters that are actively maintained, used and up-dated.

22	ITC	ES38	Recommendation 1: Big assumption here that the six clustered focus areas are the right ones. How does this fit with the development of a catalogue of products and services which align with these? Also, what is the year of the Operational Plan referred to?	The Evaluation's assessment (a conclusion, not assumption) is that these clustered areas are a good combination of traditional areas of strength and emerging AfT priorities where ITC should manageably be able to add special value. They also find the balance between being broad enough to allow adaptation and specific enough to maintain focus. Among these clusters, of course, the markets of country demand and the supply of donor support will lead to different outcomes and volumes of activity as programmes are developed. The idea of a "catalogue" of ITC products and services is to organize the "with what?" toolbox with which ITC can help tackle the "what?" (overall goals in the Clusters) and the "hows?" (programmes and projects to pursue those goals).
23	ITC	ES39	Correction: "…predictable and sufficiently funding to…" should be changed to "…sufficient funding…"	Revised.
24	WTO	ES 43, ES 39, ES 41	The report recommendations seem to be targeted towards increasing and stabilizing financial support. Another cross cutting feature is gathering support from ITCs governance structure to counter the UN burdening practices and standards in terms of budgeting. Specific and recurrent calls are made to gather support in UN deliberations in New York. One can be sympathetic to recommendations for longer funding cycles and less earmarking but this will prove very difficult to implement.	Yes, these are some key directions. See response to comment 16 above re. longer-term funding.
25	WTO	ES 38, ES 39	The report seems to suggest dropping the whole idea of country programming for broader regional programs. But we need to have clearer views on how to handle country needs assessment for example. In the same vain the report recommends the creation of a Unit on programme development and support. We need to balance out the need for this new structure with its added value.	This is a vital point on which to be very clear. The direction proposed is not to drop all country programming - and of course projects will ultimately take place in countries and their needs will have to be assessed. The course-correction proposed is rather for ITC to set aside ill-fitting and unrealizable ambitions for "full service" country programming, mimicking more conventional development agency models. Instead the Evaluation encourages trying to maximise the Centre's distinctive supply capabilities as a specialized contractor and sub-contractor for AfT - through providing global and regional services to countries and institutions, as well as direct provision to policy makers, TSIs and enterprises in eligible countries. The Unit for Programme Development and Support is proposed as a means of bringing together ITC's proven areas of expertise at a strategic level for pro-active dialogue, needs assessment, planning and design of ITC programmes with partners and donors in place of the more reactive, scattered and often donor-driven model that has prevailed in the past. There is no guarantee that it will achieve all the desired results but we are convinced that the findings show a real need for something like this.

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26	WTO	ES 44, ES 45	Recommendation 4 of the Report suggests considering "very few carefully designed and tested liaison arrangements for key regions..." this again can be sensitive if costs are attached to them. One missing avenue is to use the client base of ITC and in particular the worldwide network of export/trade promotion agencies to ensure some presence and representation.	The tentative suggestion of very targeted liaison arrangements in a few key regions is an attempt to find an affordable middle ground between more traditional country representation and a totally Geneva-centred operation that may miss out on linking into regional "nerve centres" for AfT. The ITC's network of TSI contacts is evidently very useful and has some potential for more activation by the Centre for its own contacts and intelligence. But at the same time, ITC has other, possibly conflicting linkages, with many TSIs (for example in benchmarking and sometimes selecting for cooperation) and the TSIs' own interests and priorities would often not fit with the kind of role suggested.
27	ITC	General	As required in the Evaluation Terms of Reference, there should be a methodology chapter in the report document identifying the scope and approach, main review questions and evaluation matrix, methods, quality assurance and standards applied, and limitations.	See box 1 on methodology.
28	ITC	General	Based on the review, the Evaluation Unit considers that the evaluation process and report adequately addressed the challenges in refining the evaluation scope, which are largely aligned to the evaluation TOR and the inception report. The evaluation report comprises three building blocks: i) organizational and management and changes since 2006, ii) ITC's performance and results since 2006, and iii) conclusions and recommendations. This composition is relevant to the objectives of the evaluation. In this respect, the report by and large keeps a deliberate balance in dealing the sophisticated and complex scope of ITC's numerous functions and operations, particularly through categorizing the services through various methods; the evaluation generally reaches the objective of presenting an overall picture of the performance of ITC in a complex and ever-evolving context	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points.
29	ITC	General	The scope of the evaluation also factored in the comments received at the early stage of the evaluation process, including comments provided by the Steering Committee, ITC management, the Evaluation Unit, and ITC colleagues. For each part of the assessments, the report provides supportive data and analysis, which are mostly verifiable and with sound logic. The report proposes four strategic recommendations which are broadly in line with the analysis provided in the report.	As above.
30	ITC	General	Preliminary assessment - scope: Modifications in assessing the performance of ITC since 2006 as the team considers ITC's results framework is not solid enough to support an evaluation measuring against the corporate objectives (250). The Evaluation Unit concurs with the evaluation team on this point, which is consistent with the findings of the ITC Evaluation Synthesis being prepared by the Unit. Not coherent with using Table 18 page 95?	All the summary tables and ratings in the draft report were introduced in order to bring together for the users of the results a manageable and clear set of assessments across the many fronts in this comprehensive Evaluation. Providing ratings is a way to way to further distil the assessments, but increases the risk of over-simplifying them for readers, and must therefore be handled with care. The ratings in tables 5 and 11 strictly followed the questions in the agreed matrices on organization and management and

			Weaknesses identified and revisions needed to refine methodological explanations and add a methodological section in the report. To benchmark practice between agencies	performance and results respectively, applied a stated set of criteria for ratings, and were subjected to cross referencing or validation between the two sets of matrix results. Tables 18 and 9, on the other hand, were part of the effort to generate less structured assessments across the whole gamut of ITC activities - a "top of the funnel" assessment in the Evaluation's strategy - and did not benefit from assessment against explicit criteria or Matrix 1 and 2 results. Thus Table 18 was introduced in the draft with "very forceful user warnings about the sweep of generalizations involved" and Table 9 with its own warning that "These broad generalisations need to be informed by a careful reading of the subsequent evidence organised against the matrix indicators and issues." For the final report these two less-rigorous tables of ratings have been removed, while the more nuanced narrative text on these points remains. As to benchmarking, please see response to response to comment no. 36. A brief methodological description is now included in the main Final report as well as the Annex.
31	ITC	General	In the overall, the evaluation respects the approach requested in the ToR: High-level strategic progress report. Length, format, etc. Lack of methodological description to guide readers	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points. See response to comment 27.
32	ITC	General	It is noteworthy that there is still a gap in providing a view based on bench-marking practice across agencies. It is fair to point out that the country reports, as part of the working papers, mentioned to a limited extent the performance of other agencies in the same countries. However a justification is needed on this issue.	As above.
33	ITC	General	The report should present a brief methodological section, as requested in the TOR, explaining the main methodologies, aims and limitations, and composition and structure of the report. This is required to guide readers going through this sophisticated report which aims to get a full understanding of ITC's organizational and programming functions, and makes effort to present a proper composition of various subjects of the evaluation to generate a comprehensive and balanced picture of the performance of ITC.	Now included in the final report.

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34	ITC	General	Organizational and management analysis. This part of the report is prepared in line with the TOR and evaluation inception report. The evaluation design (Matrix I) and the methods applied are relevant and sound, and the evaluation process was justified. Data presented in the report were collected through verifiable desk review work and interviews at ITC headquarters. Both the analyses presented in the report and the methodologies applied demonstrate consistence between the working paper findings and the corresponding sections in final report. In addition, the working paper on organizational and management analysis is well structured, and the rationale and logic in analysis are clear.	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points.
35	ITC	General {Table 10 in Final}	Analysis of performance and results since 2006. This is the more intricate part of the evaluation due to the multifaceted and multi-dimensional nature of ITC's services (referring to Matrix II). The complexity was also reflected in a major methodological variation as explained in paragraph 133. The analysis in this part is built around three pillars of portfolio analysis: project desk review notes, country reports, and product story boards. The desk review notes provide a horizontal view of the operations across the board, and the product story boards, focusing on line services, indicate a vertical view of the ITC's line services, which served in complementarity with the desk review works. This part of the report also includes analyses on cooperation, innovation, constraints, and potentials regarding ITC's programme management and service delivery in countries. It should be noted that there is a major methodological modification in assessing the performance and results of ITC since 2006, which was explained in the evaluation report and a methodological note provided by the team. As the consultants' team leader considers the available results data is not sufficient to assess the performance in achieving corporate objectives (para 250, draft report), the evaluation did not apply the corporate strategic objectives in assessing ITC's performance, instead, an evaluation matrix comprises criteria regarding the performance along programme management cycle is applied in the evaluation (Table 11, page 66, draft report). The Evaluation Unit concurs with the evaluation team on this point. The large volume of the analysis and multiple facets of the analysis make the portfolio analysis less structured than the previous part (organizational and management analysis) of the report. The two rating matrixes in this part of the report are not always consistent in presenting the performance of ITC's programmes. In terms of quality of analysis, the Evaluation Unit suggested the evaluation team to consider possible revisions as below: A. To ensure the consistency of ratings between different sections of analysis B. To clarify certain terms used in ratings tables, as they are not always self-evident, for example the rating in Table 11 for "Follow-up assessment and evaluations" is a rating only for "follow-up	Actions taken: A. This has now been carefully re-checked and, where justified, revised in the Final report Two over-generalized draft tables of ratings have actually been removed. B. This is true; they should not have been lumped together. The evaluation system is rated more highly in Table 2, on Organization and Management, mainly for corporate evaluations and some with ITC donors. On the other hand, the Evaluation found little evidence around self-evaluations which are more closely linked to follow-up assessments where hardly any provisions are in place. This picture has now been clarified in the Final report. C. Clarification was sought from ITC on what was meant by the suggestion to elaborate the ground work on working with Institutional partners such as UNDAF, EIF and CBI for sustainability consideration." The response was: Taking into account the strategic importance of this assessment, it would be nice to go deeper in the analysis: - What is the required approach to follow and the work to be undertaken on the ground with these institutional partnerships to develops them at larger scale? The main points to be made about these particular partnerships are i) that ITC's record with them, in addition to being a good thing in itself, is powerful proof that when international Aid for Trade resources are allocated by "honest broker" agents like EIF and STDF, ITC is in a strong position to provide the required services capably and competitively and within its defined strategic priorities; ii) that continuing to do the best possible job under these impartially-managed programmes is a top priority for ITC's viability and wider reputation, without expecting that the projects commissioned by them to ITC will always be huge: and iii) that multilateral, bilateral and other donors should be expected and encouraged (by their members in the case of all multilaterals, as well as sister UN agencies and programmes) to draw in similar ways upon ITC as proven international resource in its specialised

			assessment", not for evaluation. C. To elaborate the groundwork on working with Institutional partners such as UNDAF, EIF and CBI for sustainability consideration. D. To elaborate the judgment that ITC is unique.	fields ,especially in private sector engagement and trade. This kind of division of labour, with large capital aid investors calling on specialized TA providers rather than trying to directly manage all associated TA themselves, is very much in line with improved aid effectiveness practice and the post 2015 agenda, and meshes completely with the Evaluation's recommendation for a more pro-active, strategic ITC stance with its supporters. - How ITC can use these partnerships to improve the sustainability of its work in the field? The basic relationship implied in extending these kinds of arrangements to other donors implies being a specialized service provider or sub-contractor, but much more than a purely reactive commercial supplier, What ITC should bring is not only the excellent services and products, guided by a strategic AfT approach, but also a real web of global experience, contacts and experts (increasingly working on a South-South basis) together with its legitimacy and accountability as a joint UN/WTO sponsored organization. In turn, these partners would acknowledge these wider benefits and responsibilities of looking to longer-term and wider-scale (e.g. regional) engagements with ITC. What would be the appropriate division of labour, positioning and accountability system to be developed in such partnerships? The basic division of labour and accountability in a sense would be guided by the EIF/STDF and ITC's better Window 2 models in which ITC delivers parts of "their" programmes, for which they retain overall responsibility and accountability, and "credit" as far as necessary. As far as possible, the Team's further responses to these questions have been reflected in the Final Report. D. To elaborate the judgment that ITC is unique Para 38 summarizes the rationale for this assessment, with supporting evidence at many points in the Report. This has been further signposted.

36	ITC	General	Quality of the working papers. In consultation with the evaluation team, the Evaluation Unit verified the main working papers and, with stratified sampling method, selected samples among the about 100 analytical papers and notes prepared by the evaluation team during the evaluation process. The review of main working papers is to verify the critical linkages and consistence with the final report; and the sampling method is to ensure the representativeness of the overall quality of the ground work. It is found that the individual analytical works are organized in line with the evaluation framework, the structure of individual pieces including country reports, surveys, and analysis notes are well designed and ready for consolidation, the data applied in the analytical works are referenced and largely traceable, the data compiling notes are well presented, and the findings in working papers are grounded on related data and peer reviewed and triangulated. The verification mission to London concluded that the groundwork of the evaluation is of good quality, well structured, and therefore built a solid ground work for the evaluation report; the consistence between the main working papers and the final report is strong and verifiable.	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points.
37	ITC	General	For the better utility of this critical evaluation to ITC, there is a need to further refine the conclusions and the recommendations. To this aim, the Evaluation Unit proposed the following comments for the consideration of the evaluation team in the process of the addressing comments on the draft evaluation report: i. To ensure clear logic links between the three steps: analysis- findings-recommendations, and indicate cross references between these logic links; ii. The key challenges identified for ITC to demonstrate reliable results should be specifically reflected in the conclusions, and therefore in the recommendations. iii. To ensure the consistence of ratings between different sections of analysis iv. To clarify certain terms used in ratings tables, as they are not always self-evident v. To elaborate the groundwork on working with Institutional partners such as UNDAF, EIF and CBI for sustainability consideration. vi. To elaborate the judgment that ITC is unique	These points are now clearly covered in the final Report. See also responses to comment 35.

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38	ITC	General	Strengths in quality of Conclusions and Recommendations: - Strong and consistent connections between the working paper findings and the conclusions and recommendations of the draft evaluation report - Conclusions are largely grounded in related analysis and embedded in today's TRTA context - Recommendations are refined, forward looking, relevant to the TRTA context and ITC' s aspirations and strengths. It is considered that there are strong and consistent connections between the working paper findings and the conclusions and recommendations of the draft evaluation report. The main points in the conclusions are broadly grounded in related analysis and embedded in today's ITC's operational context, but the reference to related analyses is missing in the draft report. The four strategic recommendations provided by the report are focusing on critical strategic issues, forward looking, relevant to the TRTA context, and aligned to ITC's aspirations and strengths. However, in the same vein, the reference of recommendations to related conclusions is not in place.	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points. The more explicit linkages from analysis to conclusions to reconditions are reflected in the Final Report
39	ITC	General	Weaknesses in quality of Conclusions and Recommendations: To ensure clear logic links between analysis- findings- recommendations; The key challenges identified for ITC to demonstrate reliable results should be specifically reflected in the conclusions, and therefore in the recommendations: Inconsistent alignment of individual programmes to the corporate objectives Weak RBM (goal setting at impact level, building reliable theory of change, and cross-function knowledge sharing) Inadequate project management system regarding risk management, local partnership, monitoring and reporting results, and self-evaluation Across-board weak sustainability and exit strategies of ITC interventions Unclear institutional setting for evaluation function in terms of applying UNEG and OIOS standards and good practices. Lack of corporate approaches to addressing cross-cutting issues: poverty reduction, gender, youth, environment and climate change.	These points are reflected in the Final Report.

40	ITC	General	By and large, the evaluation report and the working papers provide verifiable and traceable data sources and references for critical analysis and findings. The sampling methods applied in data collection are sound and reasonable, in consideration of time and resource limits; the surveys (design, process, result analysis) conducted by the evaluation team are inclusive and representative when possible; confidentiality and other evaluation ethics are explicitly spelled in designs of data collection, and well respected during the evaluation process. There is no evidence of conflict of interest in evaluation process, neither any evidence of bias expressed in the evaluation findings and recommendations. However, as acknowledged by the evaluation, the evaluation faced limitations in obtaining interview opportunities with ITC-supported enterprises in countries, which may imply potential bias as the voice of ITC-supported enterprises could be missing in data collection process.	It is helpful to have EMU's confirmation on these points.
41	ITC	General	Scope of the evaluation: 5 (satisfactory) Quality of data and analysis: 5 Quality of conclusions and recommendations: 4 (moderately satisfactory) Candor and impartiality: 5 Overall quality of the evaluation process and report: 5 (Through revisions still needed)	Observation: The criteria for such ratings are insufficiently specified. The suggestions with respect to conclusions and recommendations are clear, although the expected "clear links" between findings, conclusions and recommendations in a complex evaluation report cannot be reduced to a rudimentary map.
42	ITC	General	Based on the analyses above, the Evaluation Unit considers the performance of the evaluation – process and draft report - is satisfactory. This performance is measured against the initial evaluation TOR, refined specifications in the inception report, and international evaluation practices, standards and ethics. It is fair to acknowledge that revisions are still needed in the stage of addressing comments on the draft report and revising the report.	As per comment 41 above.
43	ITC	General	A rating table below indicates the ratings for each assessment criteria, and the overall quality of the evaluation is a composite deliberation based on the individual ratings for each of the four criteria. Scope of the evaluation: 5 (satisfactory); Methodological section is needed;; Bench marking is desirable, paragraphs 8 & 9 Quality of design, data and analysis: 5; Comments provided in paragraph 15 Quality of conclusions and recommendations: 4 (moderately satisfactory); Comments provided in paragraph 17 Candour and impartiality: 5 Overall: 5	As per comment 41 above.

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44	ITC ED	General	Coherence of different sections of the evaluation report - On a more general level we are not entirely clear on the distinctions between the "Organisation and Management" and the "Performance and Results" sections of the draft report and their related ratings. The two sections partly treat the same topics, such as RBM-related questions or project management. While we are not suggesting at this stage any methodological re-organisation I do think that more detail about the purpose of each section and the differences between them would be very helpful to the reader and to ITC as we craft our management response.	The systematic separate coverage of "Organisation and Management" and "Performance and Results" was built in from the outset - as spelled out in the agreed Inception Report (paras. 37-39) - as a way of ensuring full coverage of the two main areas in the ToRs. The two Evaluation matrices set out the detailed questions and issues to be covered in each area. As explained in the Inception Report, the Organization and management matrix was adapted from an accepted framework for organizational assessments, with its final section (D) focused on "organizational performance " in carrying out the mandate of the o organization concerned. It was understood from the outset that this section would cover much of the same ground as the performance and results assessments under Matrix 2, with the vital benefit of being able to generate separately both a top-down, systemic or HQ-focused assessment and a bottom-up operational or field-based assessment based on project portfolio analysis and country missions. These two sets of results could then be analysed together and triangulated, as they have, to arrive at a more accurate picture than either would provide separately. This is an example of best practice in triangulation in evaluation. It is not at all surprising, inaccurate or "incoherent" that there are differences in some of the assessments taken from these different perspectives. Since this approach has evidently not been immediately clear to all readers, we have, as suggested, added brief further explanations in the final Report text.

| 45 | UNCTAD | General | This evaluation provides a broad range of observations against most of the questions in the ToR. The report is well organized and well drafted, but the evaluation could have benefitted from a more in-depth examination of the issues raised.

As an example, with regard to the question on what is ITC's value-added under Purpose 3 of the ToR, the evaluation does not seem to have analysed the role and status of ITC within the UN system (and in particular its relation with the 2 parent organisations), and the implications of the current role and status in terms of efficiency and development impact.

UNCTAD raised this point during the two meetings with the evaluation team. There are overlaps between ITC's work and other UN system organisations including UNCTAD on a regular basis. Sometimes these overlaps do not have negative consequences, but many times they undermine the efficiency and the credibility of the organisations, and they show operational grey areas that stem from the lack of clear substantive coordination.

Some examples of this include:
- p.15, paras. 56-57 : the "focus" of ITC is "in reducing poverty and advancing the MDGs" — any UN entity can flag this same "focus". But then on page 41, para 180, a clearer ITC "mission" is presented. In both cases, concepts such as "focus", "mission", and vision "," goals" etc. have to be defined in light of the role of ITC within the UN system and in comparison to UNCTAD and the WTO. Any "focus" of ITC seen in isolation does not reflect the reality and is misleading.
- Para.58 shows a significant overlap with UNCTAD's work, but this is not further explored, with a view to identifying ITC's 'niche'.

The report does mention 'the difficulty of identifying and categorising all of ITC's numerous and dispersed product lines' but there is no indication that the evaluation looks into underlying reasons. UNCTAD believes that this would be important for proper analysis of Purpose 3 of the evaluation. | This overall opinion is noted, but the example cited certainly does not support it. The Report extensively covers both ITC's value-added in Aid for Trade and its relationships, including with its "parent organizations." Section 2.1.3 on "ITC's Place and prospects in global Aid for Trade" provides wide-ranging coverage on the substance, as does Section 2.2.8 on Inter-organisational linkages, which has detailed coverage on links among the three Geneva institutions and ITC's collaborations with other UN operations. Further substantive coverage is found in Section 3.4.6 on "Effectiveness of coordination/cooperation with other actors, national and international (value added in AfT agenda)" Section 2.1.1 on "Governance and corporate accountabilities" covers the governance-related aspects of the relationships, and more specific analyses in other pertinent areas (such as human resources and financial accountabilities) are found in the relevant sections.

The points raised by UNCTAD in our two meetings were carefully considered and assessed as all these analyses were carried out. As the draft Report indicated, the Evaluation did not find evidence of cases of overlaps (except with a couple of bilateral programmes) that could "undermine the efficiency and the credibility of the organisations." With an eye as well to the comment on para, 58, the Evaluation stands firmly behind the following conclusion: "there are inevitably some overlap areas, particularly where ITC's practical work to support exports leads to important policy directions [and the reverse].

The Evaluation finds that the institutions should have the ability to manage these frontiers productively. In a relatively few instances ITC and UNCTAD - which are both forced to depend attracting resources for technical assistance projects - come into competition for such support. The Evaluation's finding is that some transparent competition is healthy, as with trade itself, offering options of quality and price to beneficiaries and funders." (para. 171) In accordance with   its mandate the Evaluation also stands by its points on the issue of focus, and its points on the implications of ITC's multiple product lines. |

46	UNCTAD	General	One of the questions in Annex V shows that 83% of the responses classified ITC as a technical "specialist resource". This practical assessment seems to be at odds with recommendations emphasising more strategic, global future role for ITC - i.e., less hands-on and more removed from small and medium-size exporters. Becoming yet another development middleman seems to be at odds with ITC's original mandate, and will probably not be helpful in enhancing the viability and sustainability of the institution. We thus feel that the following conclusion bears further consideration: "the present Evaluation has not found evidence to support the feasibility or even necessarily the desirability of the 2006 emphasis on "increasing the share of activity devoted to in-country projects.". If it is not in-country exporters, which are supposedly the main target beneficiaries of ITC, then what is ITC's raison d'être?	This number, selected from p.10 of Annex III, is of limited significance and its possible implications are also misunderstood in this comment. The particular number is a perception of 10 respondents on a description of what kind of organization ITC now is, and most of these same respondents also accepted two other descriptions. Only two respondents held the view that this is what ITC should aim to be in future. In any event, the comment misunderstands the thrust of the Evaluation's own conclusions, and recommendations with respect to country programming, which is totally consistent with the concern to avoid becoming another Middle-man. , This is clarified in the response above to Comment no. 29, and in the text of the Final Report.
47	UNCTAD	General	The evidence base for the summary ratings is not fully robust, as are the bases for the final list of recommendations, and we would urge caution in this regard and urge that further consideration be given in reviewing these elements of the report.	In fact, the Evaluation report models good practice in being explicit about the strengths and limitations of its own evidence on each finding ,and this flows through to conclusions and recommendations. With respect to the ratings, please see the responses to Comments 16, 21, 22, and 34.
48	Canada	General	The draft evaluation report is an impressive work. I will reinforce some of the comments put forward by other readers of the evaluation: 1) some of the recommendations seem very disparate I was wondering if they could be a better harmonization, synergy between recommendations- better linkage in what they are proposing; 2) from an evaluation perspective one found little supporting evidence to validate the findings more supporting evidence would have enriched the text a lot;3) I understand that the report is mostly for internal audience and stakeholders who are already familiar with ITC modus operandi; but a little historical context and background early in the text would have made the reading more user friendly; 4) I agree with the comments made that recommendations should have been placed in better context and presented with a range of options.	1. In fact, we and apparently other readers, believe that the strategic recommendations - backed by 27 linked (and often complementary or reciprocal) action items/ implementing responsibilities for different actors - is unusually clear and harmonised. It is true that other more specific conclusions and recommendations are found throughout the text and they will be more clearly identified in the final report. 2. More signposts back to evidence are being introduced in the final report, while trying to avoid cluttering the lean evaluation. 3. Yes, the objective should be to make this interesting and accessible to people beyond the narrow circle of ITC cognoscente. A short piece of this kind is being included in the final report, bearing in mind that history is often contested and causes many wars. 4. Hopefully, the other responses and actions will strengthen "context". With respect to recommendations, the Inception Report made clear that these would be made only if the Team concluded that there was an adequate base of conclusions to support them. It also explicitly raised the possibility of itself offering options for consideration in different areas. In the event, the Team found that there was sufficient basis to make recommendations (both strategic and specific). In most cases, we concluded that the findings and conclusions pointed toward particular options, knowing full well that they will be considered and debated, and probably provoke

				alternative or hybrid ideas and options from stakeholders for final actions.
49	Canada	General	On the ITC evaluation draft. I am struck by the somewhat dire assessment of the organization in terms of funding and sustainability. To remedy this, the evaluation recommends a fairly major refocussing of ITC management and operations, with major implications for donors (no more window two funding is the underlying message). To support these recommendations I'd like to see better connections made between the recommendations and the evaluation findings themselves. To address X major weakness or Y opportunity, we recommend Z. The recommendations might also be placed in better context if presented in a range of options. While this may not be regular practice for evaluations, understanding a range of options will enrich the discussion that will follow on responses. I also agree that more recommendations could be pulled together in the recommendation section. As noted in the document, many smaller recommendations are made throughout that could be gathered together.	On the financing issue, please see the response to Comment 16 above. As noted elsewhere the key linkages are traced more explicitly in the Final Report. See response to comment 48 regarding options. Specific conclusions and recommendations throughout the text will be highlighted.
50	Canada	General	One of the most striking recommendations by Saana counters the 2006 evaluation recommendation for more in-country presence, as the way to continuity, sustainable results. This will have implications for the overall ITC role – should it be limited to higher level strategic tools disseminated widely ?	Please see response to comment 29 above.
51	Canada	General	Saana stated it was almost impossible to find previous beneficiaries, exporters in-country for their surveys / interviews, thus low evidence was gathered. Do bilateral donors, in-country partners still have rosters of beneficiaries of ITC`s programmes, such as CIDA-funded PACT or ENACT programmes?	In the Evaluation's sample, including in country missions, such lists and contacts were most often fragmentary and out of date, with knowledge dispersed in the different heads of individual managers, specialists and partner personnel, who of course change over time . As the Evaluation notes, maintaining such contacts better is a tedious and painstaking job, but essential to fill this important gap.
52	Canada	General	While Evaluation TORs called for a concise report, we expected more than 4 strategic recommendations, and more could have been drawn from the analysis.	While the strategic recommendations featured are only four, they are genuinely cast at a strategic level and supported by 27 clear "Recommended actions" addressed to the different actors and stakeholders responsible. An additional list of more specific conclusions and recommendations distribute throughout the draft report text are also being highlighted.
53	Canada	General	The strategic recommendations for longer term, well-funded, non-earmarked programming are directed at members/ donors as well as ITC management. Should the Evaluation propose a donor / donor coordinated response as well as the expected formal Management Response?	Such a judgement is beyond the mandate of the Evaluation. ITC's existing group of committed donors and other members, together with Management, would have a much clearer grasp of the best ways to proceed.
54	Canada	General	58 project reports were reviewed, with few contacts found to follow-up (this points to a need to build, maintain , and use living rosters of ITC contacts); 200 key interviews in the field were held, but it was hard to get private sector partners to respond to surveys (no incentive).	These are basically accurate points from the draft report.

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55	Canada	General	Main conclusions include: ITC delivers high quality services in the field; its overall financial situation limits its contribution and sustainability (no surprise); its programs are insecure (hand-to-mouth, "vicious circle") and thus choices to respond to growing demand are limited. While the 2006 Evaluation recommended and led to expectations that ITC would increase its field presence, Saana goes against that conventional wisdom, arguing against a greater share of ITC activity to be in-country. Instead, Saana recommends that ITC should focus on developing tools for broad dissemination, rather than in-country implementation of projects.	These are basically accurate points from the draft report, supplemented by the clarification in response to comment 25 that "in-country implementation"' will of course remain essential, but that full-service country programming is likely to be beyond ITC's capacities and in any event not necessarily suited to its strengths. Strategic regional, sub-regional and thematic programmes are likely to be important arenas.
56	Canada	General	Donors are reassured that no findings of graft, corruption, or gross mismanagement were found (not surprising, but good to confirm).	To be clear: the Evaluation did not conduct anything like an audit on these points, but encountered no evidence of such problems in the examination of evidence and informed assessments in its sample.
57	Finland	General	The evaluation team has done a good job in analyzing ITC, its management, organization, mandate and key areas of work. The evaluation report notes the unique mandate and expertise of ITC in the area of Aid for Trade related work. It also highlights a number of areas of improvement that will have to be analyzed carefully. It notes that while ITC has moved in the right direction since the 2006 evaluation, there is still considerable room for improvement. Overall the evaluation report serves as a good basis for further discussions on how to strengthen the work of ITC. It is, however, important to note that responsibility is with the ITC "governors and supporters" to consider the best way to address some of the challenges that ITC faces, particularly as the conclusions of the 2006 and 2014 evaluations are to some degree conflicting e.g. the 2006 and 2014 evaluations differ in the need for in-country projects. ITC has been since 2006 to some degree in a constant process of transition. While it is essential to understand why this phase has taken so long and why there is still considerable room for improvement, it is important not to launch the organization into another phase of transitions. The evaluation is careful in this regard and calls for a pragmatic approach. Therefore it is important to consider carefully the recommendations before moving forward – such as on setting up a new high-level programme development unit (how would it differ from the division of programme support), setting up of regional centers or closing of down country programmes.	Confirmation on these points is helpful. Clarification on in-country work (as per response to comment 25) is important. With respect to the action points, the Evaluation definitely does favour a pragmatic, cumulative approach, and is careful to avoid proposing major de-stabilizing change at this point. To be clear, the Evaluation does not recommend closing down country programmes (of which there are anyway very few) nor necessarily setting up regional centres (which would need to be very carefully justified and mandated). The proposal to "establish and empower a small but high-level programme-development and support unit, made up of experienced operational officers" is not primarily an organizational add-on , but is intended to equip ITC as an entity to actually design and execute more strategic, results-based programmes in "pro-active dialogue with potential beneficiaries, operational staff and donors." It would have distinct functions from those of the administrative support of the Division of Programme Support or the SPPG as presently mandated and constituted.
58	Finland	General	Some of the recommendations are unrealistic e.g. that donors should provide un-earmarked funding for minimum 5 years, particularly in the current difficult financial situation that many governments face. While it is important to focus on the long-term and to avoid hand-to-mouth type of operations, these results could also be achieved through better planning, transparency and improved dialogue between stakeholders and ITC on shared areas of interest. Thus, a "reality check" of the recommendations should be done	The Evaluation's recommendations indeed do emphasize "better planning, transparency and improved dialogue between stakeholders and ITC on shared areas of interest."
59	Finland	General	We can't remember reading analysis on ITC's new corporate logical framework and its relationship with measuring impact at corporate level. This was one of	The assessment of progress made with ITC's corporate logframe is concentrated in paras. 201-208, of the draft report as well as para

			the questions put forward by the ToR.	232 and reflected in the ratings tables.
60	Germany	General	Sustainable financing: we would like to see an assessment of whether ITC could/should charge for part of its services (in particular regarding the use of its databases ("maps"). This was partially done in the past, but discontinued recently (to be transparent: against our advice).	The Evaluation Team has looked throughout for possibilities for ITC to diversify and strengthen its sources of financing and has recommended seeking counterpart contributions wherever this is possible without ITC pricing itself out of the market among less-demanding aid providers. The advantage is one of increased partner ownership as well as (moderately) increased resources. With respect to ITC charging for its database services, the Evaluation did not conduct a full study, but had no grounds to contest the seven advantages cited for the "free tools for all" proposal in the January 2013 presentation on the "MAR Strategy for Financial Sustainability and Marketing and Communications".
61	Germany	General	Recommendations: the recommendations need be strengthened and more specific, in particular with regard to shifting ITC's focus to developing clear focus areas (away from classic country programming).	See response to comments 29 and 56 as well as highlighting of specific recommendations in the text.
62	Germany	General	Global public goods: the report is mostly silent on this area of ITC's work. The assessment that is put forward is done mostly through a "country lens" (such as with T4SD). We would be grateful if you could elaborate more on this important area of work of ITC.	As noted in this comment and in the response to Comment 13, a product focus was not adopted for the Evaluation, and the Team was alert from the Inception stage to the fact that portfolio sampling and the country lens would not in itself capture information on global public good services. Thus the Team as a whole had special briefings on these products, did its further analysis and was on the lookout throughout for evidence which is reflected at various points in the Report, but particularly in para 375 of the Draft report, where the Evaluation felt confident in some important synthesis findings that are retained in the Final Report.
63	Germany	General	Factual error: the report states that all members of the steering group were interviewed – this is not the case for Germany.	We could not find a reference to individual interviews with the steering committee members, which were not conducted, although the Steering Committee was consulted at key milestones, as well as responding to the Evaluation surveys.
64	Sweden	General	Overall, the evaluation is of high quality. It is rich in observations, the analysis is clear, evaluation questions are being answered and the report is logically structured and well written (although a final proof reading is needed). The discussion appears nuanced and limitations in terms of strength of evidence are clearly accounted for.	It is good to have confirmation on these points.
65	Sweden	General	In terms of findings, we are pleased to note the improvements that have taken place since 2006, although they are described as modest. It is also pleasing to see that that the Center is given high marks in many areas, including its professionalism in its particular field of work. However, the inadequate project cycle management, M&E, risk management, reporting and knowledge management give reason for concern. We also note that there remains	These are accurate readings of the Evaluation results and are further drawn out ion some key points in the Final Report.

			considerable room for improvement" when it comes to financial systems and that sustainability constitutes a problem.	
66	Sweden	General	Relevance against strategic objectives is found to be high. At the same time country selection, project identification and selection and project needs assessment is found to be fair/poor. This appears potentially contradictory. How should it be interpreted?	This is a very understandable question. The Evaluation finding is that the overall framework of ITC's objectives and activities is highly relevant to key needs and widespread demand in beneficiary countries - in fact well beyond ITC's current capacity to serve. Moreover, individual projects examined have also by and large been demonstrably relevant in practice. On the other hand, there is little evidence of coherent processes of country selection, project identification and selection and project needs assessment. The implication is that apart from general patterns of geographical prioritization and the ongoing test of individual projects underway, there is little evidence of coherent priority-setting or an ability to do so if ITC were to be faced with less wide-open demand and/or greater supply competition.
67	Sweden	General	The evaluation provides a clear case for more predictable and non-earmarked funding. However, the case for an increase in volume is not as clear. ITC would of course be able to do more with a bigger budget, something that would hold true for most organisations. Meanwhile, the evaluation points at some severe weaknesses that are hardly a result of inadequate financing (for example those mentioned above). To increase funding substantially while these weaknesses persist seems problematic. Comments?	As noted in the response to Comment 20, and further clarified in the text, the Report's main thrust in this area is not simply to call for more, longer-term and un-earmarked donor funding, but a more pro-active ITC programme design and support strategy in close collaboration with donors, backed up by continued confidence-building improvements in management. These are deliberately linked in the recommendation as reciprocal actions needed by ITC and its supporters, even to continue to make the further management improvements needed. The decision as to how much further support ITC can effectively manage and use , and when, will be a decision that ITC management and supporters will have to make, hopefully drawing on this progress report Evaluation for guidance. The need to be able to project longer-term funding is shown to be a serious test of donors' commitment to sustainable results from TRTA. The findings show that there are large costs, and limits, to how much shorter-term support can be patched together to achieve sustainable results.

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68	Sweden	General	Although this has not been an impact evaluation it would be useful for the reader with at least some examples of results of the centers activities. One way of doing this could be to insert findings from some of the cases as "boxes". (Please disregard if this is outside the scope of the evaluation)	The Evaluation has taken it as a responsibility to give the most objective and balanced picture possible of ITC results from its sample coverage, rather than "cherry-picking" and editorializing about either apparent success stories or problem cases. Further, given the diversity of ITC products and working contexts, claims of finding general conclusions on project results would mostly be simplistic over-generalizations. However, the Evaluations have presented grounded assessments at several levels. At a very broad level, Section 2.1.3 in the Draft Report, on ITC's Place and Prospects in Global Aid for Trade, and particularly para. 38 shed light on ITC's comparative results. Further light is shed at a somewhat more specific level in Section 3.3 on Performance and Results at the levels of ITC's broad objectives and client groups. Then, throughout Section 3.4, findings about results emerge in relevant projects or clusters of projects in relation to the assessments against the specific issues in the agreed Matrix 2. Finally, findings on results emerge at the most specific level in Sections 3.4.7 on Notable accomplishments, etc., 3.4.9 on Main Problems or constraints and possible better alternatives, and 3.4.10 on Strengths, key lessons and ITC potentials. Some further claims re summarized in the Spreadsheet page on "Comments 6-10" For other sources referred to by the Team, please see as well Annex VIII, "Examples from past evidence on ITC's contributions to results."
69	Sweden	General	The recommendations are – intentionally - rather broad, giving decision makers various options. This is fine but makes it important that ITC to presents a clear "Management Response", commenting on all of the recommendations, and outlines action to be taken as well as follow-up activities. This Management Response should be subject to discussion between the Center and donors.	This comment is primarily directed to ITC management. The explanation and some sharpening of recommendations in the Final Report should help ensure clear management responses and good follow-up with IT C members.
70	Sweden	General	The richness of the report makes it a good basis of continued discussion and possibly also for action beyond the explicit recommendations.	It is good to have confirmation on these points.
71	UK	General	First of all, we appreciate the hard work done by the consultants in undertaking this very complex evaluation. ITC's disparate activities across some 100 developing countries, over the past 7 years presented singular challenge. The report provides an extensive organisational review. It contains a lot of information on the management, administration and financial systems in ITC and the reforms that have taken place. In addition it provides a high level and systematic assessment of ITC function and operations. However at places it feels that these are too high level and perhaps need to be justified with clear examples.	This confirmation is appreciated. Links to the Evaluation's evidence are more clearly signposted in the Final Report, but there are still limitations around the basis for generalizations and protecting the confidentiality of traceable responses around some individual projects. See also the response to comment 68.

72	UK	General	We do understand that it's a process evaluation which is mainly focused on the operations of ITC. It does inform us that the key areas of improvement for ITC are: - Clear articulation and definition of theories of change for each of the identified strategic priorities. - Further streamlining and ingraining results based management in the design, implementation and reporting of ITC programme/project activities. - Building and maintaining better capacity in Monitoring and Evaluation. - Project cycle management still requires improvement despite the implementation of a project design quality assurance process in ITC since 2012.	These are all important aspects of the Evaluation results.
73	UK	General	Our specific comments on the contents of the report are as under which we expect the consultants to respond to in their final report.	Please see responses to comments here and refinements in the Final Report
74	UK	General	1. There is a recommendation to provide longer-term financial support. This has been predicated on the assumption that shorter programmes have failed to give 'breathing space' to ITC. In this respect it is important to recognize that while choosing their development partners, donors are increasingly looking for strategic-fit in terms of programmatic priorities and demonstrated ability to deliver results with regards to operational capability. This would require that the latters' organisational priorities are underpinned by well-defined theories of change; and their project management and M&E systems are robust reflecting best practice. The report shows that ITC still has got substantial work to do in these areas. In view of this, it would be useful to spell other options that may be considered for improving ITC's strategic performance.	Please see responses to comments 20 and 68. As noted and further clarified in the text, the Report's main thrust in this area is not simply to call for more , longer-term and un-earmarked donor funding, but a more pro-active ITC programme design and support strategy in close collaboration with donors, backed up by continued confidence-building improvements in management, including those highlighted in this comment . On these fronts, the Evaluation finds that ITC is on the right track, but will also need more support and realistic expectations to reach the desired levels. Thus the ITC and donor supporter actions are deliberately linked in the recommendation as reciprocal measures needed by ITC and its supporters, even to continue to make the further management improvements required. The decision as to how much further support ITC can effectively manage and use, and when, will be a decision that ITC management and supporters will have to make, hopefully drawing on this progress report Evaluation for guidance. Together with the management response it could provide the basis for an agreed agenda for further improvement between ITC and its members. The need to be able to project longer-term funding is shown to be a serious test of donors' commitment to sustainable results from TRTA. The findings show that there are large costs, and limits, to how much shorter-term support can be patched together to achieve sustainable results.

75	UK	General	2. The report also recommends that ITC should adopt 'good enough' systems for project cycle management, results based management etc. It would be useful to elaborate how 'good enough' systems differ from 'high performing robust' systems. Secondly, what are the reasons for suggesting such an apparently low ambition for ITC. Is it the quality of the human resource which is a limiting factor or are there other organisational factors that would prevent ITC from developing 'best practice' systems rather than just 'good enough' ones. It must be said that there are other players in the Aid for Trade space and if ITC doesn't stay ahead of the 'pack' then it may be in danger of losing its distinctive advantages.	"Good enough" systems are not intended to imply anything less than high performing and robust systems, but to counsel ITC and its multiple masters against striving for theoretically perfect systems, rather than those that actually meet ITC's key management and accountability needs within its limited financial and management resources. Having such a useable, useful and used system should actually commend ITC to potential donors, and serve as a model.
76	UK	General	3. It is also recommended that although ITC faces a complex and burdensome governance system but instead of attempting its reform; recourse should be made to have an informal 'friends of the chairs' group. It is mentioned that reform of the governance systems was attempted some time but it faced difficulties representational matters. It would be important to clarify that without resolving the governance situation how other linked issues (e.g. delays in recruiting) could be rectified.	The Evaluation concurs in the judgement of most of its informants that it would probably be better for ITC to work within and around some of these constraints rather than re-open potentially paralysing negotiations on governance and administrative reform. At the governance and programme advisory level, the pragmatic solution of engaging senior expert representatives of members in Geneva seems best. The Evaluation Team has found most evidence of constraints in the application of a UN management culture, practices and oversight requirements to a small , private sector oriented organization that needs to be nimble and flexible. As seen in some of the comments and responses here, ITC's administrative Division differs with this assessment, finding current ITC practices beyond criticism and/or considering UN requirements to be unquestionable. The Final Report has been revised where appropriate on these points, and presumably it will remain for the Management Response and discussion with ITC's members and governors to set the future course. Meanwhile, the Evaluation has recommended ending the formal remaining involvement of UNCTAD and WTO in recruiting (which was probably no longer causing major delays or burdens) and it should be stressed, as the Report indicates, that WTO oversight and UNCTAD involvement have not been onerous.
77	UK	General	4. In any evaluation getting beneficiaries' input is critical. Consultants did conduct 60 confidential interviews in preparing this report. It would be useful to get a breakdown of the groups interviewed and also to get a sense of the range of beneficiaries covered during the interviews.	The 60 confidential interviews referred to were at HQ, mainly ITC management and staff. In the country missions a total of 185 interviews were conducted For more detailed breakdowns, please see the annex VIII to this paper : "Categories of Interview responds"
78	UK	General	5. The report does not provide clear insight in the state of ITC programme portfolio for its suitability to deliver on ITC's current strategic priorities and goals. We understand that this is primarily a 'process evaluation' however it would be good to have some idea of more relevant and high performing programmes.	Please see the response to comment 13. It can be amplified to the extent of noting that across its samples and country missions, which included sign cant coverage of a wide range of programmes the Evaluation did not find any evidence of any that were consistently weak or weaker than others.

79	UK	General	6. The report mentions that 'there are encouraging examples of development benefits' however, in the text there are hardly any details or case stories where the nature and scope of benefits has been documented. Even in places where reference has been made to individual projects there is no clear mention of any results achieved / benefits delivered. These details should be provided.	Please see the response to comment 68.
80	UK	General	7. With regards to ensuring 'sustainability' of ITC efforts, it is suggested that follow-up visits and checks should be built into project design and budgets from the outset. This may cover one aspect of the 'sustainability' spectrum. Real sustainability could only be achieved when ITC has succeeded in 'transferring and embedding' its expertise and knowledge in the local context either in TSIs or other local institutions. The report has not documented any example where this has been successfully achieved. This leaves the question open as to the effectiveness and sustainability of ITC initiatives/interventions.	The criterion for sustainable success posited in this comment was not explicitly used throughout the Evaluation, and would be a very difficult one for most development agencies to claim and prove credibly. Having said that, we are able to pull out some encouraging findings from detailed evaluations of ITC's programmes and projects, both broad and narrow, as cited below: - the Supply Chain Management - Modular Learning System Programme is considered as a highly sustainable model for capacity development, through matching technical assistance and local resources and potentially a strong multiplier effect. For example, in 2011 the programme provided "train the trainers" support to 225 trainers, and achieved an outreach of approximately 3,500 participants; the train the trainer approach was found to lead to the effective transfer of skills, knowledge and expertise to beneficiaries in EnACT, South-South Cooperation and PACT II programmes as well; PACT II has been valued successful in building trade analytical expertise and information systems and in building capacity for the RECs to adequately support trade development and TSIs; - Similarly to the SCM - MLS, the NTM II reportedly attained notable accomplishments in TSI strengthening. Involved TSIs were judged able to use independently and directly capacity acquired thanks to the intervention, in terms of both on-going service delivery and extended service portfolio, although in the future emphasis should be on TSI financial sustainability; - the Trade Promotion projects I and II in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reportedly allowed for a considerable development leap, through substantially increasing the capabilities of business support providers on one side; on the other side, according to many business owners and managers, enterprises benefited from improving internal procedures (technology, products, operations), and especially from a shift in their mind-set towards market-orientated decision making, following the intensive programme of trade fair participation, seminars and trainings**.** Having noted such positive findings, however, the accompanying theme is the need for ITC's contributions - like those of most development agencies- to evolve from a demonstration mode to a fully-embedded mode on a wider scale. Alongside the positive findings, common examples of identified deficiencies include : a

				lack of strategy and vision (various); too ambitious goals for too little financing and / or time (E.g. PACT II) ; moderate implementation capacity for EnACT, MLS, WEDF and low moderate for SSC : "However, evaluations indicate that at the outcome level results remained partial for the following main reasons: - Follow-through after the implementation of activities is often lacking; - The project planning cycle is not 'full-cycle'; and - Frequent slow start-up times for projects. operations and with its partners."
81	UK	General	8. Issues and challenges with respect to having an effective evaluation system have been very clearly highlighted. However, it would have been useful to mention key insights gained from the evaluation conducted by the ITC Evaluation unit in 2011 and 2012. What do these evaluations tell us about the effectiveness of the ITC programmes in terms of benefits delivered and expected results achieved.	These syntheses were carefully studied, but have not been reported on specifically, but the Report's Annex VIII on "Examples from past evidence on ITC's contributions to results" refers to them as well as individual evaluation inputs.
82	UK	General	9. It is encouraging to see that ITC has successfully shifted its geographical focus towards least developed, small island and land locked, and sub-Saharan African countries.	These broad trends were confirmed.
83	UK	General	10. In case of indicative findings against strategic objectives the report is generally positive about the relevance, outcome and impact of activities undertaken but does not give any indication of results achieved or mention any examples/case stories of successful projects.	See response to comment 68.
84	UK	General	11. The effectiveness of ITC projects has been judged as 'good…with strong positive feedback'. This should be supported by some concrete examples from the selected portfolio.	See response to comment 68, and sections 3.3, and 3.4.4 in particular.
85	UK	General	12. There is no clear positive or negative assessment regarding 'Value for money' as the opinion seems to be based primarily on the responses received in response to the questionnaire. It would be useful if an indicative assessment is done by comparing the value for money aspects of activities undertaken by ITC with those of other comparable organisations (for instance, the World Bank, regional development banks and other UN agencies like UNIDO). This could for example include the costs of consultants deployed in developing countries and the level of management costs charged to manage a given portfolio of projects.	Please see the response to the comment under comment 203 about the general challenges of assessing "value for money" in development cooperation and the point arrived at on this issue in the Evaluation. The suggestion in the comment that ITC might be compared with other international organizations on such issues as the level of management costs or the cost of consultants deployed in developing countries triggers a whole range of issues of methodology and the availability of comparable data to support such comparisons. To underline this point, even after more than 50 years of statistical analyses and peer reviews of members' programmes, there is still no accepted DAC methodology for comparing

				administrative costs among bilateral aid programmes. In one 2008 study "Where does the money go, best and worst practices in foreign aid", Easterly and Pfutze set out a table evaluating several multilateral and bilateral organizations on the basis of the following indicators: Ratio Administrative budget to ODF and Ratio Salaries and Benefits to ODF. However, the authors admit to data on overhead costs to be the least trustworthy of the whole paper, due to operating costs of aid agencies been widely unavailable. They found out some interesting trends however and tremendous variation across agencies (UN agencies typically have the highest ratios of operating costs to aid by a large margin).
				DFID's Multilateral Aid Reviews (MAR) in 2011, updated in 2013 provide what the UK calls "value for money" assessments of a range of two dozen multilateral agencies so far from the viewpoint of the UK Government, hinged its appraisals to nine components grouped into two indices: (i) the contribution to UK development objectives, which primarily assesses what organisations do; and (ii) organisational strengths, which primarily assesses how well they are organised and managed. organizational effectiveness. While aiming at a broader judgement of "value for money "than is envisaged here, the UK Reviews do not include the same range of evidence or rigour in arriving at judgements as this Evaluation. The UK MARs have not yet included ITC.
				Bearing in mind the important caveats about trying to use data on overheads and consultant and other input costs to assess value for money and the fragmentary character of the data available, the Evaluation did collect some data on overheads and other costs from some Programme / Project Evaluations (see "Examples of overhead costs in ITC projects " at page 70 of this annex), although not from AAACP (where there are for the other 4 IOs involved, but not for ITC).
86	UK	General	13. There is recommendation of have regional hubs whilst recognizing that the experience of Mexico office hasn't been a success. However, no clear 'lessons learnt' have been mentioned from that episode to inform the proposal of these regional hubs. Secondly, the role and function of these satellite offices needs to be spelt out more clearly with some indication of cost-benefit analysis.	In fact, the Evaluation carefully stops short of firmly recommending such hubs. Instead it proposes as an option to realistically enhance ITC's links among beneficiary countries and regions, recognizing its constraints, "to consider a very few carefully-designed and tested liaison arrangements for key regions." These could build on streamlined geographic offices, and/or targeted representation in key centres. The Evaluation does not claim to have conducted a full assessment of the Mexico office experiment, but encountered sufficient evidence in its research (see response to Comment 102) to state firmly that it was ill-prepared, while on the other hand the research encountered no evidence of contributions or roles in other countries apart from shares of the budget of the office being

				attributed to other country programmes. The main lessons to be learned from the Evaluation's findings in this area are exactly that the rationale, role and function of any satellite offices for ITC would need to be designed and spelt out more clearly than in the Mexico office case with some indication of cost-benefit analysis, and with provisions for clear testing periods and analysis of their performance and utility.
87	Switzerla nd	General	You have assessed that ITC and its services are too little known in developing countries. This might be linked to the fact that for an organization of the size of ITC it is a challenge to work in so many countries with a "diffuse and dispersed" project portfolio. We noted and support the conclusion not to develop a conventional system of "country programming". Did you find any information that a consequent integration of ITC projects in frameworks like the EIF or the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity could be of help to tackle those problems and increase the visibility of ITC?	Yes, these are key questions and possible directions. As indicated in paras. 4 and 165, of the draft Report the Evaluation found strong evidence that the EIF and STDF frameworks have indeed proved to be highly effective in calling on the international resources that ITC can muster most effectively. Presumably these effective roles and ITCs selection for them also help increase the Centre's visibility and credibility, but the Evaluation found no clear evidence that they have led to further opportunities beyond these competitive programmes. With respect to the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity and UNDAFs in individual countries, the Evaluation's limited sample suggests that these involvements for ITC tend to be small ones, in part because ITC roles may depend on the awareness and goodwill of representatives of larger UN organizations more powerful and present in New York or on the ground, where ITC has limited opportunities to make its own case.
88	Switzerla nd	General	We have taken note that the evaluation led to the conclusion that ITC, as a small organization and despite its external and internal constraints, has provided high quality services in its specialized field, even with some unique assets. Steps have to be done however to improve its full effectiveness, especially on the project cycle management, the sustainability of the results, as well as on the RBM (we know that impact is not so easy to tackle). The report is very comprehensive, well presented and gives a lot of useful information.	This confirmation is appreciated.
89	WTO	General and ES 2.1	First on the analysis part of the evaluation and in particular with regard to ITC's (i) Enabling Environment (ii) organizational capacity (iii) organizational motivation and (iv) organizational performance. It is striking to note that despite a fairly conducive environment in Aid for Dev (A4T in particular) there were only few positive changes to project management and programming as well as little to no change in the partnerships and clients relationships of ITC.	Two factors may help explain this situation. One is that a good deal of the change taking place in ITC has come relatively late in the period under assessment. The second is that the financial and other constraints stressed in the Report have limited ITC's capacity to take advantage of growing opportunities in the AfT field.

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90	ITC	1		Please clarify if this analysis refers to the period up to 2012 or 2013?	Strictly speaking, the Evaluation was to cover the period 2006-2012 inclusive, and most of the coverage and analysis of projects focuses on that period.. However, since the country missions took place in Jan-Feb 2014 and included a good number of ongoing projects, it would have been artificial and in fact impossible to cut off coverage at the end of 2012, so it was brought as far up to date as solid information would support. On the Organization and Management front, the coverage extended up to November 2013 when the main data gathering and interviews in Geneva were completed. A number of comments and criticisms of the draft Report by ITC staff seem to relate to further changes made in 2014. The Evaluation cannot be constantly scrambling to keep right up to the minute, so any important developments since November 2013 should be reported in the Management response.
91	Sweden	3		On page 1 it is stated that "the obtainable information base on ITC activities over most of the Evaluation period (…) was found to be fragmentary at best…". How has this impacted on the evaluation process? What conclusions are drawn from this, regarding the Centre and its activities?	This situation reflects the fact that ITC's improving management information systems have really begun to take hold only in the last four years or so and are not yet completely operational. For example, the systematic archiving for each project of all key milestone documents in the project cycle and other key materials on the projects portal, as well as records for client relationship management will be important not only for such purposes as evaluation and external accountability, but for professional management and learning. The movement to better management has been in the right direction and needs to be sustained and supported with sufficient resources for ITC staff to be able to take the time to do this work properly rather than scrambling so much to keep new projects flowing.
92	Finland	7, 12, 15, 28, 77, 402, 406, 408		One of the questions in ToR was to analyse pros and cons of additional structures, such as a Board. This is somewhat reflected in the text but more clarity on this topic would be helpful.	Please see the response to comment 76.
93	UNCTAD	9		It is unclear what the evaluation team refers to in this paragraph about "cultural differences" and "occasional conflicts of interest between the organisations". Please clarify.	See comment 49 for references conflicting interests with ITC perceived by UNCTAD, which were made even more explicit in UNCTAD meetings with the Evaluation Team, centred around overlaps in the respective activities of the organizations and frankly-acknowledged competition for voluntary donor funding. The cultural differences perceived by the Team relate to an entrepreneurial, opportunity-focused culture in ITC oriented to serving private sector actors, differing from a more formal, bureaucratic culture conveyed to the Team by designated UNCTAD spokespersons.

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94	ITC	10, Box 2	JAG and CCITF do not approve the ITC Budget. The Regular Budget approval described in Box 2 should be corrected as follows: ITC's Regular Budget has to be approved by WTO GC, UNGA and their subsidiary bodies.	The Team had understood this, as seen in Figure 1, but this reference had slipped in here. Corrected.
95	ITC	12	"opportunistic, fund supply-led approach to programming" should clarify coherence with later conclusions that there were no major divergences from strategy / mandate in projects and that projects were overall done with client / donor input based on needs (e.g. paragraph 379)	Please note the response to comment 66. The fact that the Evaluation did not find major divergences or inappropriate projects in its sample does not change the fact, or the dangers, of the funding supply- led approaches . As para. 380 continues. "Broad regionally or thematically-focused voluntary support, or support for attractive and innovative programmes run a greater danger of "cherry picking " and leaving aside "orphan" bread-and-butter activities that may not be attractive to donors but still essential to beneficiaries. Moreover, ITC's ability to deliver earmarked programmes and projects depends on being able to draw upon an adequate core capacity, which is not now assured."
96	ITC	16	'Proper systems for performance management have only just been introduced'. I don't think that this is correct – colleagues tell me that the predecessor to the new ePAS system was in place since at least 2006. It was certainly well established when I arrived in 2012. It may not have been used well, but it was a formal system that conformed to modern standards.	The evidence is that performance management is only just gaining hold within ITC with the new ePAS system - clarified.
97	ITC	20	Window 1 resources "largely managed by the External Relations Unit" is not correct.	Corrected: "W1...., largely managed by the Senior Management Committee (SMC), ..."
98	ITC	28	The evaluation team has stated that it has found no evidence that the regional office in Mexico has provided any benefits to the countries it was supposed to serve. It would be important to verify which sources of information the evaluation team has used in order to make that statement. It would be important to see whether country members have been consulted on the subject. In addition, neither OLAC nor the regional office in Mexico has been consulted by the evaluation team in order to discuss the situation and context of the office. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the opinion of the evaluation team regarding poor definition of the rationale, functions, and particularly, corporate-wide support for the regional office has had an impact on the performance of the office, particularly in terms of generating new business opportunities. As expressed earlier on this report, ITC lacks flexibility and does not have the culture to become a decentralized organization. Therefore, it cannot provide adequate support and follow up to activities and needs expressed from the field. One example relates to the fact that a growing number of business opportunities in Latin America are in the form of bids or "calls for proposals". The current policy is that ITC cannot participate in such schemes, thus the loss of traditional donors to support projects in the region that could have been generated through the regional office.	As stated in the response to comment No. 86 the Evaluation does not claim to have conducted a full assessment of the Mexico office experiment, but encountered sufficient evidence in its research (key sources listed below) to state firmly that it was ill-prepared. On the other hand the research encountered no evidence of contributions or roles in other countries of the region apart from shares of the budget of the office being attributed to other country programmes. The main lessons to be learned from the Evaluation's findings in this area are that the rationale, role and function of any satellite offices for ITC would need to be designed and spelt out more clearly than in the Mexico office case with some indication of cost-benefit analysis, and with provisions for clear testing periods and analysis of their performance and utility. Key Sources: • W1 Request for funding ITC office in Mexico 10 2007 • Aviso Apertura Oficina ITC en Mexico 2008 • Section 13 (ITC) – Supplementary – PPB 2010-2011 • SMC 28112012 Minutes • Project Plan W1 Office Mexico 2013 2015

				• Proposal for P4 post for Head, Regional Office, Mexico City , undated.
99	ITC	38, bullet 3	Trade support institutions is missing.	Added
100	ITC	38, bullet 5	The efforts regarding women in trade are not related to the Ethical Fashion Initiative. Text should read "…Initiative, efforts to achieve economic empowerment of women in trade and link them to international buyers, and path-breaking…".	Amended
101	ITC	44	Clarification required: According to the Evaluation, "...undisputed comparative strengths" that ITC contributes to Aid for Trade? Justification should be provided in the text in order to substantiate this statement.	Para. 38 of the draft report summarises the substantiation for this statement, drawn from many other parts of the Report. Further, in the spirit of "market-testing", paras. 4 and 165 of the draft Report the Evaluation found strong evidence that the EIF and STDF - without having competing institutional interests of their own - have called increasingly on the international resources that ITC can muster most effectively .
102	ITC	52	Reference to the word "today" should be clarified. As of 1 January 2014 "…all projects have to be approved by SMC…" is no longer true with the $300k level for PAC approval.	Amended
103	ITC	55, bullet 2	"….geared largely to architecture …" Clarify or substantiate what this means.	Amended
104	ITC	63 & Box 4	UNDG definitions and OECD definitions are worded differently. ITC adheres to the OECD definitions. See ITC Project Design Guidelines at http://itcnet.intracen.org/dbms/Docman2/Documents/FA18040.pdf	The Team was aware that ITC has used the DAC definitions, and deliberately suggests that it should instead use the UNDG definitions cited, for the reason that trying to apply the DAC definition of "impact" has consistently led to expectations that are unrealizable and attempts to over-claim direct results, especially in capacity-building assistance and trade-related technical assistance. In light of its own wide comparative experience with these challenges, the Team strongly endorses the key UNDG definitions as far better suited to ITC. This has now been clarified in a specific recommendation in the Final Report.
105	ITC	66	"… a workable system…" not clear a system for what?	Results-based management. Clarified in the Final Report
106	ITC	69	"… does not substantively analyse gaps in the A4T arena…" this implies ITC is independent of ongoing initiatives when ITC is actually an integral part of the initiatives mentioned. Clarify or contextualize this statement.	We stand by the comment in the draft Report. The fact that ITC is part of the AfT Initiative and existing partnerships, surely should not preclude its continuing ability to further "substantively analyse gaps in the Aid for Trade arena, and where ITC could usefully complement existing initiatives."

107	ITC	71	"Economic Competitiveness Section" should read "Enterprise Competitiveness Section": not aware of any such section.	Corrected
108	ITC	73	This report will be read by various audiences, including the ACABQ UN Committee of the GA who have requested a copy and the OIOS Inspection and Evaluation Division who will be conducting an Evaluation of ITC in 2014. Thus the use and definition of various terms need to be understood by those reading. In paragraph 73 reference is made to "staff" which has a specific meaning under the UN Staff Regulations and Rules. The data includes interns and consultants who are not "staff" under the UN Regulations. We have provided corrected data giving you "staff" numbers from the IMIS system of record and suggest you use them in table 1 and that you adjust your language in paragraph 73 and footnote 13, 14 to reflect this information.	We take note of the highly technical definition that UN seems to apply to "staff" and at the same time note that normal stakeholders want to know clearly how many people are working in different categories - information that was almost impossible to find. This has been amended to show both IMIS "staff" numbers and best estimates. for the total workforce .
109	ITC	73, Table 1	The data presented in SANAA's report (para 73, Table 1, page 19) is incorrect as their figures include non-staff data which should not have been included in any staff counts. Corrected figures are as follows: For 2013, total of staff = 276 (Source is IMIS database - as at 31 December 2013). The figures exclude: non-staff personnel such as consultants, individual contractors or interns as well as exclude all staff who have separated during the year. For 2005, total of staff = 205 (Source is IMIS database). The figures include staff and exclude non-staff personnel. Detailed figures by division are as follows: DBIS Posts 2013 - 49; DCP Posts 2013 - 55; DMD Posts 2013 - 74; Department of Operations Posts 2005 - 129; DPS Posts 2013 - 69 and Posts 2005 51; OED Posts 2013 29 and Posts 2005 25; Total Posts 2013 - 276 and Posts 2005 - 205. The associated footnotes 13 and 14 on page 19 of SAANA's report are equally erroneous and should be corrected.	"Erroneous" is an erroneous term. Adjusted to take staff numbers provided.
110	ITC	73, footnote 13	If the 'internal directory' referred to is the "Who is Who" list on the portal, it includes anyone sitting in the building and is not limited to staff only.	This was well understood. It was a great help in trying to know how many people were actually employed at ITC HQ
111	ITC	74	When reading there seems to be a suggestion that HR is part of OED. HR is part of the Division of Programme Support; maybe if HR/DPS is added it would be clear. This might occur since both SPPG and Communications are part of OED and the paragraph begins with a comment about OED staffing. Also there is a statement that there in only a single full time officer devoted to donor relations. In fact, and as reported to the ACABQ and the GA in the Regular Budget documents for 2014 2015 there is a regular budget funded D1 post responsible for supervising the P4 donor/external relations post. It might be more correct to say that due to the existence of a vacant D1 post there is currently only one P4.	The organizational specifications are noted. The draft Report's statement that there was only a single full time officer devoted to donor relations was not inaccurate - the Evaluation has been more concerned throughout with actual people carrying out tasks rather than the numbers of authorized posts or their bureaucratic status.
112	ITC	75	There are only 10 CMs in DCP and two Chiefs plus the EIF coordinator (plus 1 regional office in Mexico) who perform all of the related functions. Most of other staff is working on project implementation.	Comment quoted in the Final Report

113	ITC	75, footnote 15	Factual error in the number of country managers: OEECA - 2 (1 CM plus 1 Chief performing CM functions); OAP - 2 CMs. ECA is not a Section, as this does not appear in the list of acronyms, it would be good if this appeared in full as Eastern and Central Africa. Allocation of country profiles can be found at: http://itcnet.intracen.org/dbms/Docman2/Documents/CTRY15824.pdf	Revised as relevant.
114	ITC	77 vi	"piggy-backed on specialized programme capacities": unclear what is meant by this. Clarify this statement further	Further clarified in the Final Report
115	ITC	81	Paragraph is incorrect and does not accurately describe ITC's legal framework. As a joint subsidiary organ of the UN (through UNCTAD) and the WTO, ITC is fully bound by the financial and staff regulations of the United Nations. However ITC's broad delegation of authority gives ITC a high degree of autonomy in respect to human resources functions. Human resources policies promulgated by the UN Secretariat do not, by default , apply to the ITC by virtue of section 2.3 of ST/SGB/2009/4 which states: "Administrative issuances shall not apply to the separate administered funds, organs and programmes of the UN , unless otherwise stated therein, or unless the separate administered funds , organs or programmes have expressly accepted their applicability". The result of this framework is that ITC has a very wide authority to set HR policies. Having said that it is important to underline that ITC has no authority to derogate from the UN Staff Rules and Staff Regulations, which must be applied in full. Notwithstanding its considerable delegation of authority, since 2011 ITC has followed an explicit principle of aligning its HR policies, as far as possible, with those of the UN Secretariat. ITC HR policies are usually drafted with reference to the UN Secretariat's provisions on the same subject and are often substantively identical. Deviations are only introduced where there is a specific operational need. Any amendments are subject to senior management review (and Joint Advisory Committee review/input, where appropriate). Staff members are selected to positions and not posts and source of funding during a staff member's contract may change. A lateral transfer between 2 posts with different funding sources is within the authority of the Executive Director. This is not a deviation from, but rather follows, the UN policy and procedures. The distinction from different sources of funding was abolished with the promulgation of the new UN Staff Rules and Regulations effective 01 July 2009. The information about WTO and UNCTAD representatives is incorrect and does not accurately describe the status and role of WTO/UNCTAD representatives on ITC's Review Bodies nor does it reflect accurately the mandate of those Bodies. Additionally and importantly, there is no promotion system at ITC. Promotion does not exist in accordance with the UN Staff Rules and Regulations whereby all fixed-term recruitment including promotions must go through a full competitive process including review from a Central Review Body. On 1 November 2011 (not 2012 as indicated in the draft report), ITC issued its new ITC Staff Selection Policy (ITC/EDB/2011/02 and Central Review Bodies policy (ITC/EDB/2011/04). The	The specific factual corrections in this paragraph to information originally received by the Team from different ITC staff have been reflected in the Final Report. To provide the precise references the detailed observations provided by the ITC administration in this comment have been reproduced in a footnote. Should there be a need for further specification, the management response to the Evaluation would provide the vehicle.

			mandate of ITC's selection committees was revised and closely aligned to the UN Staff Rules and regulations and the UN policy. The Central Review Bodies were established to review and provide advice to the Executive Director on the recommendations for selection of staff for appointments of one year or longer as follows: Central Review Board (P-5 and D-1 levels) Central Review Committee (P1 to P4 levels) Central Review Panel (G-5 and G6 level) When either the Central Review Board or Central Review Committee reviews and advises on recommendations for the selection of staff to posts financed from the regular budget, UNCTAD/WTO representatives sit on the respective panel as non-voting members. ITC is not bound by any formal geographical quota in respect of recruitment. In addition to the general comment above, note that the ED, under the UN Staff Regulations and Rules has the right to transfer any staff member, regardless of the source of their post funding, to any other post at the same level. No UN staff have a "normal" right of transfer across the UN. Within the UN Secretariat staff are considered "internal" candidates in competitive selections. ITC, whose appointments are to service only within ITC are considered "external candidates" to competitive selections within the UN Secretariat. There are some exceptions to this generality defined by the Secretariat.	
116	ITC	82, bullet 1	The HR monthly reports have been provided to SMC since 2010 and are posted on intranet so all ITC staff have access. However, following the recent OIOS audit recommendation to cut down on over-detailed reporting, HR monthly reporting has been reduced to quarterly reports. SMC has approved this change.	Revised
117	ITC	82, bullet 3	Factually incorrect: The competency-based approach has been systematically followed at ITC for all recruitments since 2008. Referring to our comment to paragraph 81 above, we wish to reiterate that no promotion system exists at ITC. Please either substantiate 'the available evidence' or remove this bullet point.	The formal distinction that there is no longer "promotion" as such in ITC has been noted and reflected in the Final Report. The substantive interest is in whether there has been and is any strategic approach to staff development and advancement, which has clearly been and remains an important concern for those working at ITC (See staff surveys). The Team stands by the statement that 'available evidence suggests that this has not been rigorously followed in practice'. It draws on interviews with many staff, who said that their annual appraisals just did not take place, and actually seeing a number of appraisal forms which had been signed but not completed by managers. The precise periods involved are not specified, but ITC would be well advised to take such considered evaluation findings to heart rather than reflexively challenging them.
118	ITC	82, bullet 4	The information is incorrect. ITC launched the e-performance module of the Cornerstone On Demand Talent, Learning and Performance Management software in the form of 'My Career Development' on 1 April 2013. Concomitantly, ITC promulgated a revised Performance Management and	The date has been adjusted from 2014 to 2013

			Development Policy through ITC/AI/2013/02 which, inter alia, aligned to the UN April/March performance cycle.	
119	ITC	82, bullet 5	The information does not accurately describe the status of the 2014-16 People Strategy or its latest substantive revisions. The 2014-16 People Strategy was presented at SMC on 31 March 14 and is now undergoing final revision pending expected endorsement and promulgation this month. Goals 3 and 4 have been updated as follows: 'Goal 3: To support all ITC staff in their continuing professional learning and development and performance improvement.' 'Goal 4: To create an enabling environment in which all staff can reach their full potential by promoting a healthy, facilitative and supportive workplace and prioritising diversity and gender balance.'	Naturally, the Evaluation Report cannot capture all new developments since November 2013. If some such points are considered important enough, ITC can update in its management response to the Evaluation.
120	ITC	83	Vacancy rate. According to the HR Report to the SMC effective 4 April 2014 ITC's vacancy rate is down to 9%. Same report shows December 2012 at 14%, December 2013 at 10%.	2013 percentage readily adjusted, though the source post-dates our study
121	ITC	83, bullet 2	In line with the Executive Director's compact, we will be using the following metric to assess progress: 'Number of vacancies filled by female candidates and/or candidates from LDCs, Developing Countries, LLDCs and SIDs increased compared to previous year'. In 2014, ITC is taking concerted action to redress this imbalance and to support women's advancement at all stages of their career. HR has updated Goal 4 of the People Strategy with a view to strengthening its diversity and gender components. Based on this, a series of activities have been devised, including workforce planning, target setting, exit interviews, scorecards, and accountability frameworks. ITC has a range of policies already in place, particularly in relation to recruitment, staff selection and work-life balance. These will need to be reviewed and strengthened in order to accelerate progress.	This information post-dates the study. If some such points are considered important enough, ITC can update in its management response to the Evaluation.
122	ITC	83, bullet 3	In line with the Executive Director's compact, we will be using the following metric to assess progress: 'Number of vacancies filled by female candidates and/or candidates from LDCs, Developing Countries, LLDCs and SIDs increased compared to previous year'.	Post-dates our analysis. If some such points are considered important enough, ITC can update in its management response to the Evaluation.
123	ITC	84	While the development and refinement of ITC Recruitment and Selection policies was difficult and contested, but this was partly a result of a full and significant consultative process between ITC Staff Council and Management. The information on Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) and the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) is incorrect. The MEU and UNDT appeals mechanisms for UN Staff only came into existence on 1 July 2009. From 2010 to end 2012, only 15 MEU cases were registered. Only 6 of these cases were appointment-related and were filed by just 2 ITC staff members. ITC did not lose a case.	First point - the observation stands: it was difficult and contested. Second point - our data is from an Annex to the JIU report 2012/10 on: Staff-Management Relations in the United Nations Specialized Agencies and the Common System: Specific Note on SMR at the International Trade Centre (ITC) dates corrected. If some details are considered important enough, ITC can update in its management response to the Evaluation.

124	ITC	85	Any 'short time frame for…funding streams' would, by definition, only impact on project-funded positions not on regular budget-funded posts.	Simply, what the Evaluation found was significant evidence that the in-house workforce was not sufficient, or could not be made so through hiring, in time to meet operational demands on projects. The Team is frankly unable to follow how some of the complex distinctions elaborated in the ITC comments between the Centre's appointments to posts and positions actually function in providing the needed workforce for a largely project-funded programme.
125	ITC	86	Clarification required: it unclear as to what is referred by '30 contracts unknown'. The source cannot be Internal HR data since there is no 'unknown' type of contract in the HR records. Please substantiate, clarify or remove.	Revised to indicate that the data provided were unclear on this point.
126	ITC	87	Please remove the reference to 'promotion'. As indicated above, the UN has not had a promotion system in place for many years. Incorrect interpretation of 'fixed term' contracts. Not all fixed term contracts require the sourcing of 'work months'. In fact a significant minority are funded for a full 12 months through the annual budgeting process.	Revised
127	ITC	88	Clarification required: the wording in this paragraph is not clear, please substantiate.	The Team, and it appears other readers of the Draft report, find this very important statement clear. To respond to the comment, however, it has been re-stated in a footnote.
128	UNCTAD	89, 99	There are several references/complaints about the fact that UN rules prohibit the extension of consultancy contracts beyond 24 months, which "constrain ITC's business practices". The UN rule clearly defines that a consultant is "an individual who is a recognized authority or specialist in a specific field, engaged by the United Nations under a temporary contract in an advisory or consultative capacity to the Secretariat. A consultant must have special skills or knowledge not normally possessed by the regular staff of the organization and for which there is no continuing need in the Secretariat. In this regard, it seems clear that rather than the problem being with the UN rules, it is more a management issue as if there is knowledge of "continuing need", the post should have been filled according to the established procedures rather than perpetuate the reliance on consultancy contracts.	This is an assessment by the Team, not based on any complaints from the ITC central administration. UNCTAD'S management criticism and advice will be seen here by all stakeholders.

| 129 | ITC | 89 | "…most large Programmes have been required to recruit an individual..." project budget and finance assistant to manage spreadsheet work-planning, project management analyses and accounting, progress towards results, project data capture and entry and donor / internal ITC reporting. This work is essential, yet most of it is normally performed in other organisations by integrated enterprise activity management applications.

 The overhead cost to ITC of the time of individual project budget and finance assistants dedicated to these tasks and associated Project Manager time that could be avoided with a good integrated system is in excess of USD 140,000 per year per large Programme (e.g.: AAACP, Fiji, PACT II, PACIR). Without such systems there is a lack of accuracy and clarity over forecasting and variances between planned versus actual delivery of activities and planned versus actual cost of activities being delivered." "For consultancy contracts…. Beyond 24 months, meaning…" change to that ITC cannot provide continuity of technical assistance specialists for longer term projects where continuous working each month is not foreseen, but where the total overall duration of work months exceeds 24 months. An example is in the case where several different sector development projects covering the same sector e.g.: mangos may span 4 or 5 years duration without consistent work every month for a single consultant specialist. The total work months across all ITC mango projects may easily exceed 24 within the first 3 years – but because of the lack of continuity between projects it may not be possible to stack up enough consistent work months to engage a consultant under a fixed term contract. Suggestion work with UN to prolong till 36 or 48 months in any 5 years period. "…individual financial project manager…" this does not apply consistently to large projects currently managed by SC. While there are project managers, it is not accurate to say that all large projects hire 1 FTE to manage only finance. They vary considerably in complexity based on donor reporting requirements, number of sections etc.. The Evaluation seems to suggest that ITC has the choice not to follow UN systems and controls. We do not. As a joint subsidiary organ of the UN (through UNCTAD), ITC is fully bound by the financial and staff regulations of the United Nations and must apply the UN systems and controls. Please remove. | The substantive points stand, with adjustments in the Final Report , including quoting the ITC administration's comment that the ITC has no choice but to apply UN consultancy rules. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation. |

130	ITC	89, bullet 1	Given our status as a joint subsidiary organ of the UN, ITC has no choice other than to use the IMIS platform. Additionally, ITC is not aware of any IMIS limitation which causes, directly or indirectly, the requirement to recruit individual financial project managers. Please remove or substantiate. Also, The IMIS system does not respond to the financial and results reporting requirements of individual donors. For example the type of detailed reporting required by EU projects is not supported by IMIS. However when I worked at the WHO their financial system at the time also did not support such specific and detailed records as the EU required. The relevant issue might be the detailed level and specific nature of reporting requirements that add additional costs to project implementation rather than the nature of IMIS. I do not know of any UN system financial system that is capable to responding to all the different donors' reporting requirements. My experience from talking to others is that large complex projects with specific financial and qualitative reporting requirements always require staff to meet those needs. If there is a common system organization that has automated systems that easily respond to such specific donor reporting needs please let me know so we can see if we can beg or borrow from them.	Project managers interviewed within ITC were clear on the limitations of IMIS, which is dated and limited in the kinds of data it can generate (financial reporting)- not always corresponding to project needs and requirements. This issue is not only limited to ITC and not only to donor reporting requirements. Consequently, and in part due to IMIS limitations, they had hired project staff, an explicit part of whose role is to generate the kinds of financial and other management data needed for real-time project management. Slightly amended for this nuance in the Final Report. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation.
131	ITC	89, bullet 2	It is unclear what the intention of this bullet point is. The Evaluation seems to condone long term consultants' contracts and seems to suggest that ITC regularly hires consultants for 24 months period when this is not the case. Please clarify and substantiate or remove. ITC promulgated a new consultants' management policy in March 2014 which is closely aligned to the UN policy. Both OIOS and the Board of Auditors have been informed of the promulgation of this policy as both entities had noted the requirement in their respective audits in 2013 & 2014. Fixed-term posts must be filled through competitive fixed-term recruitment. The use of consultants with reduced entitlements is limited to the hire of external expertise not available from within the organization. In respect to the limit on the length of consultants' uninterrupted service with ITC, would it be useful to add, that after a one year break they can be hired again as consultants for ITC?	The point is not about "condoning" longer-term consultancy contracts to abuse consultants, but observing that ITC is limited in its scope to appoint consultants beyond the 2-year limit imposed by UN rules, when in fact for good business reasons the need may be for longer, but not necessarily permanent, people. See the example in ITC's own comment 129. There is no suggestion in the text that ITC in fact hires consultants for longer than this period. The Evaluation's point stands. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation.
132	ITC	90	ITC has fully implemented a consultant roster and database as well as a new electronic workflow which has an integrated performance evaluation module. This makes it impossible to close a consultant's contract without first completing the mandatory performance evaluation. The information on the status of the new online consultants management tool is incorrect. The tool was developed and piloted in 2013 and rolled out in early 2014. It is now fully operational. ITC disagrees and find the 'miserly' comment subjective and entirely inappropriate for this type of evaluation. ITC follows into the UN's consultancy rates promulgated in the new CIC policy (ITC/AI/2014/04) which contains provisions to match market rates under certain circumstances. Regarding the 7th line, could we insert OIOS prepared risk map after the 2013?	On the first point, the comment post-dates our study, but a specific adjustment has been made. Second, the term "miserly" is clearly a direct quote from a credible informant, illustrating the Evaluation's finding that ITC rates are not profligate. As far as we know, there is nothing in appropriate about this word which dates back more than five centuries.

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133	ITC	93	Again the evaluation seems unclear on ITC's position within the wider UN system and how this affects ITC's policies, procedures and systems. (i.e. making reference to 'applying unwieldy and inappropriate UN-inspired systems' as if there were other options for ITC to pursue. Is the Evaluation suggesting that ITC should move away from the UN system? Please clarify or remove. ITC firmly refutes the statement that ITC applies 'unwieldy and inappropriate UN-inspired systems'. It is important to note that despite IMIS' limitations it allows for significant savings in terms of sharing functions such as Payroll and Treasury. IMIS will be soon replaced by the UMOJA system which has extended functionality at limited cost to ITC. If ITC were to opt out it would need to develop its own system (budget of millions of USD) and maintain it on its own in addition to creating the functions shared above. Please clarify or remove. Whilst ITC is bound in most cases to UN rules and systems, where possible and when it is in the best interest of ITC both from an economic and from a staff welfare perspectives, HR has implemented solutions specifically tailored to ITC. For instances, HR has already made efforts in providing "clear, fair and transparent systems" with the introduction in 2013 of the on-line performance and Learning and Development modules and for early 2015 at the latest an e-recruitment platform. This platform will be integrated with our training and appraisal platforms systems and will allow for more effective and streamlined processes as well as greater transparency and accountability. ITC disagrees with the suggestion that ITC has a 'functional equivalent of a caste system'. The 2009 UN Staff Rules and Regulations removed the distinction of a post's funding source in order to promote greater staff stability and reward performance by dissociating the granting of continuing appointment from the staff members' funding source. In this respect, ITC follows relevant UN policies and processes. Please remove.	These detailed observations are now available to all stakeholders through this document. The Final report has been adjusted to avoid inexactness. Should any of importance remain, the management response to the evaluation would allow for further precision. Overall, however, the Team is unconvinced by the rejection by the ITC administrative staff of any suggestion that UN-inspired systems and practices can be unwieldy and inappropriate for ITC's business and performance . At some points the responses are a rigid interpretation that "ITC has no option but to apply" UN-inspired systems and practices", elsewhere that they are the best of all possible worlds, then "Whilst ITC is bound in most cases to UN rules and systems, where possible and when it is in the best interest of ITC both from an economic and from a staff welfare perspectives, HR has implemented solutions specifically tailored to ITC." The Team has clearly expressed its independent findings, conclusions and recommendations on these points. Whether and how ITC's managers and governors decide to act upon them is now in their hands.
134	ITC	94	The 2007 OIOS report indicated 'financial management' and not 'financial management systems' as a 'higher risk'. Specifically it reported as 'higher risk' the areas of fund raising and that the 13% support costs charged by ITC is not competitive. The report assessed 11 financial risk areas and found 2 to be of higher risk and 9 to be of moderate or lower risk. Also in our view 'moderate risk' do not warrant the 'description 'wanting. Suggest the paragraph be reviewed so it conveys the correct perspective. Also any reference to financial systems should reflect the reality that ITC uses the UN's financial systems and had reviewed the possibility of opting out of UMOJA but for operational and resource reasons is unable to do so. Finally while a reference is made in paragraph 97 about IMIS dating back to the 1990s, it does not convey the constraints of using a system designed for producing financial statements to produce management information and that UMOJA may offer some relief.	These detailed observations are now available to all stakeholders through this document. The Final report has been adjusted to avoid inexactness. Should any issues of importance remain, the management response to the Evaluation would allow for further precision.
135	ITC	96	Window 2 as a rule is earmarked so not clear about the degree of earmarking. Clarify this statement	Obviously all of Window 2 is earmarked. The observation about the implications of different types and levels of earmarking came

				directly from concerned ITC staff, and was assessed as significant by the Team. Final Report text is made more specific..
136	ITC	98	Grant Committee reviews and recommends to the Director DPS, they don't 'authorise' Also 'senior management representatives' may give the impression that it is the SMC. In addition, It is not clear what 'corporate reporting' entails. Procedures rather than 'regulation' surrounding the grants committee. "Grants over $50,000 must be authorized by ITC's Grant Committee, comprising senior management representative. However, corporate reporting, audits and travel all apply UN rules". Grant Wording: The Grant Committee does not authorize grant. The grant committee's role is to advise the decision maker, the Director DPS who approves/"authorizes" the grant. Please refer to the terms of reference of the Grants' Committee. Suggested wording: Grants over $50,000 must be approved by Director, DPS, following a positive recommendation by the ITC Grant Committee. However, Corporate, audits and travel all apply UN rules - Wording and tone. Note that UN rules is understood to mean the higher level of principles we adhere to and follow. As such they should not be confused with their application imbedded in certain processes. Those processes are fully within ITC's decision and control and can be modified would the tools we used support it. I would rephrase this sentence as it links to the next 2 paragraphs and found that the examples cited below in paragraph 99 are not making the appropriate cause–effect link to support the conclusion hold in paragraph 100.	These detailed observations are now available to all stakeholders through this document. The Final report has been adjusted to avoid inexactness. Should any issues of importance remain, the management response to the Evaluation would allow for further precision.
137	ITC	99	The example cited: "The evaluation found evidence that… The detailed and inflexible accountability and permission requirements for item such as budget adjustment and mission travel…." UN travel policy and rules never prevented any mission travel. The example above refers to internal approval processes that are fully in ITC's realm to adjust and tailor to the level of accountability it deems fit for its business. Hence using this example to support that UN rules (much higher level of authority) is constraining ITC's business practices is farfetched. "..the prohibition on appointing consultants …" limiting the length of appointment of consultants is fairly consistent in labour law of developed countries as a way to prevent employers from using consulting relationships to mask what is really an employee relationship. In my view this is not UN specific. Fact that we have to go to the WTO for the budget has no relation to UN regulations and rules. Can we get more information on the statement 'The detailed and inflexible accountability and permission requirements for items such as budget adjustments and mission travel.' We have requested some further clarification on the third bullet but could you also add a clarification about "budget estimates" please. Are you referring to regular budget adjustments, or extra budgetary budget adjustments, or project (most likely extra budgetary) budget adjustments? The processes are very different between RB and XB. XB project budget adjustment processes are very largely within ITC's hands so we would have an opportunity to adjust. There is a difference between UN	These findings by the Evaluation Team were based on repeated concerns raised by significant numbers of credible informants, who obvious cannot be named. If ITC's administrative services contend that there are no such significant problems, ITC's managers and governors will have to satisfy themselves as to where the truth lies and whether action is required. These detailed observations are now available to all stakeholders through this document. The Final report has been adjusted to avoid inexactness, .while retaining the valid substantive points, well supported through the evidence.. Should any issues of importance remain, the management response to the Evaluation would allow for further precision

			Regulations and Rules where we are limited and ITC self-imposed internal policies and processes.	
138	ITC	100	Second sentence: replace "contributing" with "contributed". In addition, based on the examples given in paragraph 99, using those examples could be counter-productive for ITC managers to make credible business cases for real "adjustments" to the application of UN rules when needed and warranted. ITC would lose all credibility with UN top managers if it requested adjustments to UN travel rules because of ITC's business practices (a volume of around 3000 trips for 4M$) when the same rules allows for the UN secretariat to travel world-wide for volume that is 10 folds ITC's one. The travel rules are a sensitive topic brought several time in front of the General Assembly whereby the latest revision aimed at achieving savings by curtailing the level of accommodation provided to travellers.	These points were not hinged to evading sensible UN travel regulations. It remains a fact and a finding that inflexible rules (the ITC's own if that is the case) were frequently cited as a constraint by credible informants.
139	ITC	107 {Tables 10 and 5 in Final}	[And Paras 108-110, 113, 121, 123, 124, 131] Tables 11 and 20. Project identification and design are rated as Poor/Fair (current fitness) and Some positive (change since 2006). These paragraphs seem very positive on the project design process and it is then difficult to find evidence backing the "Poor/Fair – Some positive" ratings. Considering the current fitness and the change since 2006, this gives the impression that the baseline was very low and the change since 2006 was not very significant and if this is the case, it is not substantiated in the text. The rating in Table 11 of the Draft Report for "Design processes and tools" is not consistent with the rating in Table 20 for "Project identification and design".	These ratings and the related text have been subjected to another round of careful review and cross-checking between the Team members mainly concerned with the two different matrices. Indeed, the baseline was found to be extremely low, as documented in the 2006 joint evaluation. Please see also response to comments in 18 and 186 , specifically: It is true that the PQAG, etc. processes have sought to improve the rigour of the design and approval processes. What is much less clear is the rationale and processes for the identification and selection of projects and countries, where the overwhelming evidence is that the ITC approach has been reactive and/or improvised based on unsystematic contacts or funding possibilities. On the other hand, we stand by the evidence for more positive ratings from our sample on the ground, In fact, there is no inconsistency between the two sets of ratings, or with the Evaluation's overall conclusions and recommendations. The point here is that from a systemic perspective the fitness was still not satisfactory ("fair") for the reasons above, while our limited sample of projects was actually somewhat better, with hardly any evidence of inappropriate or poorly designed projects actually on the ground . The most plausible explanation for the more positive sample reading is a wide open demand for ITC projects and good pragmatic competence by the operational experts setting up projects.
140	ITC	111	Most of the projects evaluated in 2012 were designed before the advent of ITC's project design and quality assurance process, therefore, it would be unfair to judge the effectiveness of the organization's project identification and design systems on the basis of those evaluations.	Here once again there is the issue that the Evaluation covers the 2006-12 period and, as the comment indicates, only in the latter part of the period did improvements begin to take hold.

141	ITC	115	"MLS SCM was scheduled to close in 2013". No, the programme is not scheduled to close; we have just come to the tail end of Seco's current funding phase. A proposal for extension is being prepared; there is no intention to close the programme. Substantiate or remove.	Adjusted
142	ITC	123	Inconsistency with the Executive Summary. ITC's success in up-scaling projects within its portfolio is not reflected in the Exec Summary.	From its sample, the Evaluation identified 12-15 cases of scaling-up on different scales, but also considerable evidence of many more cases of failure to provide a base for such scaling up. Therefore, this is not simply categorizable as an area of "success" for ITC. We will ensure that the Executive Summary reflects the most important points in the Report in a balanced way.
143	ITC	128, bullet 4	The RBM platform is already fully integrated from a user perspective in the Project Portal. There is a tab on the project main page that take you straight to the outputs and outcomes section (without additional logging on or selecting your project). Perhaps this confusion arose because the 'Project Design Portal' and the Projects Portal are not at all integrated (which is an issue)	Corrected
144	ITC ED	134 - 137	Risk identification and mitigation We consider that there is merit in reassessing the rating of Very Poor for risk identification and mitigation (B6). Although we accept that ITC does not yet have a comprehensive risk management framework (this is something we will have by the end of the year) we have been systematically examining and planning mitigating measures for the risks of our new projects since the establishment of the new quality assurance process in September 2011. As part of this process, every risk identified during the design of a project's logframe has to be assessed in a risk management plan, which includes mitigating measures and related responsibilities. The effectiveness of this approach has been confirmed in the above-mentioned OIOS audit of project management at ITC (2013/067), which states in paragraph 23, page 6: "Although ITC did not have a formal project risk management process in place, it had initiated discussion on developing a structured project risk framework. In the absence of such a framework, the quality assurance process played a key role in risk assessment of projects." Moreover, as part ITC's corporate planning for the biennium 2014-15, every Section and Division has undergone a thorough assessment of internal and external risks in the first half of 2013. The consolidated risk register was analysed by SPPG and discussed by ITC's Senior Management Committee as a milestone towards developing a more in-depth corporate risk management framework.	On "Risk identification and mitigation", the Team has now taken into account the points made and evidence provided here and raised its rating from "very poor" to "poor", noting that an informal system has been functioning, See also response for comment 185.

145	ITC	138	Provide evidence that regulatory and systems limits the adaptability, particularly on travel management. Management of Official international travel is centralized through a travel agency in Geneva for travel world-wide. Is this referring to "per diem" given to workshop participants and the method used (UNDP as a service provider) to execute the payment of the "per diem"? Moreover, clarify how the "imposed" use of UNDP procurement systems in the field also constraint the adaptability of ITC's activities? Note that ITC, through the mechanism of "Authorized Field Expenditure", entrusts UNDP with providing a service (HR, Per-diem, Procurement etc.) ITC provides managers with the option of using UNDP as a reliable service provider to carry out procurement or the other option to have the procurement carried out from ITC Geneva.	Adjusted. With respect to ITC's resort to UNDP for certain services in the field, presumably on the assumption that it will be "a reliable service provider" the Evaluation found evidence of cases where ITC received poor service (probably as a smaller "client") and of misplaced UNDP intervention in procurement. This is not to claim that there is any easy answer for ITC with its limited means in the field, but it is never healthy to be de-facto a captive to any single supplier.
146	ITC	140	[And para 141] The form is called the 'Request for Change' and is required when a project needs to be altered from its original budget, duration or scope against a clear set of thresholds of responsibility (see attached document – Project Cycle Management Change Control Process). Minor variations in expenditure do not all require a Change Control. See point above. Annual budget limits are set through the Operational Plan and the accompanying procedure for modifying those limits known as the Budget Adjustment process. This is a one line item for SMC approval. Without these controls the management of ITC cannot know the overall financial picture of ITC in any given moment in terms of agreed budgets. These are therefore critical controls and act as far more than a 'management information tool'.	Adjusted.
147	ITC	141	The change control process is only relevant for the overall project budget. Adjustments to annual budgets undergo a much simpler process: SPPG presents adjustments "in bulk" to SMC for approval	Reference added in the Final Report
148	ITC	142	This significantly under-plays the advances made in evaluation. Every large programme in SC has been evaluated once in the past 2 years, either self or independent. This was not the case in 2006. Also, should this read "project monitoring and evaluation systems" (i.e. not management)?	Adjusted.
149	ITC ED	142 - 151 & Table 5	Re: Sub-section Project monitoring and evaluation systems, the draft report differentiates, rightfully, the project monitoring and evaluation and the ITC independent evaluation function. However, in the ratings Table 5, the rating is provided only for "project monitoring and evaluation systems"; and a rating for the "independent evaluation function and system" is missing. Clarification between these two interdependent but different functions would be constructive for ITC management in guiding future actions. To ensure consistence in terms in the text, we suggest that the report clearly differentiates the ITC independent evaluation function and the project self-evaluation function, the latter includes monitoring, MTR, completion report, follow-up assessment, impact study, and other results tracking, reporting, analysis activities.	This is a legitimate point, The two have now been sub-divided in the Final Report.
150	ITC	147	Guidelines on project evaluation budgets are also stipulated in the project	Added.

			design templates.	
151	ITC	152	In the case of large programmes, include the role of programme managers (as separate section chiefs) in relation to process management. The report does take into account the lack of clarity associated to the roles of section chiefs and the programme managers – since project managers need to report to both (programme managers and section chiefs) in the case of large programmes.	Added
152	ITC	153	Authority for approval of small projects has been delegated to PAC (2014)	Naturally, the Evaluation Report cannot capture all new developments since November 2013. If some such points are considered important enough, ITC can update in its management response to the Evaluation.
153	ITC	158	Internal communications: there seems to be an inconsistency between the data in in the paragraph and the comments regarding internal communications, and the associated rating, in Tables 4, and 20 of the report and Table 2 of the Executive Summary. The evaluators cite improvements in staff dissatisfaction levels regarding internal communications as falling from the 43%-44% range for the various questions to the 12%-17% range. To be consistent with this data, the evaluators might want to consider upgrading "some positive" to "major positive" and "fair" to "good" in the tables. Also, The survey referenced was conducted in 2011, the Dalberg report is dated February 2012.	It is true, as the draft report stated, that the responses to the Evaluation's survey in 2014 on the same internal communications questions showed substantially lower dissatisfaction levels and somewhat higher satisfaction levels than the 2011 Dalberg survey (published in 2012). This evidence of encouraging improvement, and supporting evidence from interviews, was reflected in the Evaluation's positive ratings of change since 2006 and current fitness. For several reasons, the Team is not prepared to move to even more positive ratings on the basis of this evidence. The reasons are: 1. The evaluation period extends from 2006-2013 for this purpose and it is clear that there were major problems in the middle of that period (e.g., the separate 2011 OIOS survey found that 71% of 136 respondents disagreed / strongly disagreed with the statement that: 'The organizational structure that resulted from the Change Management Process facilitates the flow of information throughout the ITC.' 2. The improved snapshot in the 2014 survey from the 2012 counterpart is unfortunately based on a much lower response rate (21% vs. 56%) and even within the respondents group, the share of "undecideds" ("Neither agree nor disagree") rose from 10.5% to 24%, perhaps reflecting something of a "wait and see" attitude regarding the new management. The population coverage was also somewhat different. On this basis the Evaluation maintains its positive overall ratings, but is not yet able to go to the highly positive levels suggested by ITC. This is consistent with the final finding in that section of the report " Interviews in late 2013 also found cautious but renewed optimism among staff regarding internal communications, with staff indicating a sense of greater openness, and the absence of a culture of blame-laying, under new management." Note: the comparison in the draft report of results on areas where change would most affect satisfaction has been

				removed in the Final Report as the 2014 responses were found to be invalid (totalling 193%).
154	ITC	159	ITC's Communications Division should be changed to Communications Section. We recommend the following amendment to the following language (to point out that ITC's communications strategy led to the implementation of the various activities, rather than the other way around which the current text implies). ITC's Internal Communications Strategy that was rolled out in February 2013 led to the launch of a monthly e-newsletter. Town hall meeting were introduced to improve two-way communications.	Adjusted.
155	ITC	Section 2.2.8	The section focused on limited partnerships and networks with UNCTAD, WTO and other international organizations. It is therefore suggested to extend and give information about: - The partnership with big donors (Canada, SECO, EU, DfID and others); - The MOU signed with the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation from the Islamic Development Bank Group; DATE? 2008 and - The initiation of the Aid for Trade for Arab States who started in 2011/12.	An informational box on a range of other partnerships has been added, gleaned by the Team from Annual Reports and other sources. It is clearly stated that the list is not definitive, and the Team has made no assessment of the value or importance of these partnerships. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation.
156	ITC	166	Partnerships have to not only be built around projects. We have long standing partnerships with ISO, WIPO, etc. Overall, relatively few comments on this strategically important issue.	This point is now referred to, but the Evaluation does not have sufficient information on what ITC's "non-project-related" partnerships consist of, or contribute, to make any informed assessment of their potential or actual "strategic importance". In response to this point, however, the long and disparate list of partnerships assembled in Box 7 does not convey an impression of any clear strategic approach, and the Team has not seen any such approach articulated in ITC documents.
157	ITC	170, bullet 4	Factually incorrect: The NTM programme is not 'jointly implemented' with UNCTAD and WTO. As for WTO, the linkage with the NTM work of ITC was that both ITC and WTO were part of the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST), a group of technical experts from eight international organizations, including also UNCTAD, which carried out ground-breaking work on establishing a new international taxonomy of NTMs, which was adopted in November 2009 (the 'new nomenclature'). After 2010, collaboration essentially entailed information sharing. For example, ITC has contributed substantive data and insights based on the NTM surveys to feed into the 2012 World Trade Report on NTMs. Regarding UNCTAD, prior to 2010, ITC and UNCTAD jointly implemented pilot surveys in the framework of the abovementioned work of the MAST, in order to test the new nomenclature. Since 2010, UNCTAD and ITC closely collaborate in the collection of NTM data, which is a joint effort together also with the World Bank and the African Development Bank. This is however only a small pillar of the NTM programme. The NTM surveys are carried out by ITC only. We therefore suggest to replace bullet point 4 by: cooperation in the work on NTMs: - Prior to 2010, UNCTAD, WTO and ITC jointly designed the new international	Revised in the Final Report to accept ITC's corrected and elaborated details.

			NTM classification in the framework of a Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) comprising in total 8 international organisations. In addition, ITC and UNCTAD jointly implemented pilot surveys which served to test and refine the classification; and - Since 2010, UNCTAD and ITC collaborate in the collection of NTM data, which is made available through both ITC's MAcMap and UNCTAD TRAINS database.	
158	ITC	182	Communications or at least the Press Officer was always housed in OED or DED. During the change process and over a few years' time various Communications related functions were regrouped, for example the Web function moved from the IT Section and the Editor post in CSS/DPS was abolished and moved to Communications with a new role, also the production side of Communications, i.e. the printing service was moved from DPS to Communications CE/OED.	Adjusted.
159	ITC	183	The web strategy was developed in 2009, not 2007 as stated	Corrected.
160	ITC	184	The Communications and Events section is well staffed but with vulnerable resources: XB, temporary staff and consultants. In addition, a Chief of CE was only appointed in 2014 (after the section was created as part of the change management process)	Adjusted.
161	ITC	187-193	Though the paragraphs are said to be based on research and interviews, and even though this section has identified some innovation and relevant programmes, many of the conclusions are essentially negative and do not correspond with the findings from the staff survey which (particularly Section 4). If culture is important it would be good for a more balanced perspective to be reported.	The evidence sources are cited in the paras - these were derived from the evidence arising from the organizational/management analysis, including 50 plus interviews. In itself this is neither negative nor positive - the defensive interpretation/reaction is misplaced.
162	ITC	204	Section logframes" and "Section Plans" have been mixed up. The first sentence of the paragraph indeed seems to talk about "Section logframes" whereas the remainder actually describes "Section Plans". Section logframes" were developed in 2011 to define the outputs (services) and outcomes that each technical Section provides to operationalize ITC's corporate strategic framework. These were used to build the RBM system. They are a major element in ITC's online application for monitoring the achievement of development results at the project level. "Section Plans" were developed in 2013 as a planning tool to set out goals, strategies, expenditure, resources, milestones, risks, etc. for the biennium 2014-15. There are also "Division Plans" which represent a summary of the underlying Section Plans. Correction: change "2014-16 biennium" with 2014-15 biennium".	Adjusted.
163	Finland	20 8 - 212	It would be useful to have a piece of text about RBM also in the executive summary.	The revised Executive Summary does not go into these specific aspects in the same way, though this issue is noted in the Summary Table, and the treatment is refined in the main Report text and Chapter 4.

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164	ITC	209, footnote 56	1. Clarification: Poor Communities and Trade Programme (PCTP) works with more than 30 community groups. However, only 12 of them were selected for evaluation purposes. 2. Mistake in the ITC Press Release. In 2010 PCTP worked with 5000 micro-producers.	Adjusted. The footnote references ITC internal communications, in which these concerns were raised by staff.
165	ITC	210	The paragraph is factually incorrect, please revise as follows: "Overall, in 2013, the ITC RBM system was still a work in progress: applying the data generated under RBM into programming has been limited, with a tendency to focus on data rather than use; and unclear feedback loops from RBM system to sections / into learning. A major institutional effort has however been put in place since 2011 (if you have a TOR or something that can back this it would be helpful). A project team was established in January 2012 to work on the online architecture, to develop training materials and to devise and implement a training plan for ITC's RBM system. Key actions have included: - The development of the 'RBM portal', linked to the projects portal, which provides the main online RBM reporting architecture; - 60 staff members trained in RBM by the end of 2012, with the aim to reach all relevant staff by end 2013; - All projects screened for the relevance and robustness of outcomes and outputs; and - An RBM module and glossary is now available on the intranet which set out for staff how to link a project output, how to edit output indicators, how to link to a project outcome, how to select and edit outcome indicators, and how to report on your project. In December 2012, a staff member was appointed to work explicitly on the maintenance of the online RBM system. ITC's Development Results Webpages were made available to donors in March 2013, and were later made available to the public and formally announced on ITC's website in August 2013."	These are minor clarifications, not "corrections", They have been clarified in the Final Report. .
166	ITC ED	210	Recent progress in embedding RBM We have been systematically using a robust logframe approach in project design since September 2011. At that time our focus was very much on making project design most effective, and we adopted a broad understanding of results-based management. A more narrow interpretation of RBM may not have taken into account other significant improvements that contribute to managing by results, e.g. the introduction of Section logframes, a rigorous project design process, training on project design and logframes, quarterly project performance reviews, new change control processes and annual budgetary control and oversight processes. With reference to the statement in paragraph 210 of your main report, I would point out that our development results have been online since the CCITF meeting on 15 March 2013. They were initially only accessible to members of the CCITF to solicit their feedback but were then made available to the wider public and formally announced on ITC's website on 5 August 2013 and they have been kept online and updated since. (see press release at http://www.intracen.org/news/ITC-makes-public-results-of--technical-assistance-	The operative points in this comment have been capture in the immediately preceding response and revisions. The focus here is on the RBM 'system' as the paras clarify - not the broader aspects of RBM which are covered in other areas of the report.

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			projects/)..	
167	ITC	213	This paragraph is not accurate: (1) The evaluation function is not new and was in place prior to 2006: (a) Up to May 2004 there was a Senior Quality Assurance and Evaluation Officer (P5). After his retirement, the post was changed to Senior Programme Officer (P5), though evaluation was included in the responsibilities, the post was not completely dedicated to evaluation. (b) As stated in the 2006 Evaluation recommendation number 18: ""ITC's evaluation function should be strengthened and made independent from operational functions. Evaluation should be linked to the implementation of RBM."" According to the Management Response, ITC agreed with the recommendation and emphasized that the evaluation function was in fact fully independent from operations. (c) In 2007 the P4 post of Head, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit was classified, and was advertised in October 2008. However, the post was not completely dedicated to evaluation, and was re-classified in May 2012. (d) In 2010 a RB-funded Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (P3) was advertised, and the vacancy was filled in 2012. (e) In 2012, a XB-funded Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (P2) was advertised, and was filled in 2014. (2) The ITC Evaluation Policy was developed in 2008, not in 2009.	Adjusted.
168	ITC	216, Bullet 1	"Since 2012", should be changed to "Since June 2013".	Changed.
169	ITC	216, Bullet 2	Can this statement be substantiated? Financial data is available on the projects portal. Please note, two issues to be addressed: RB costs not available; and budgets are not structured according to logframe and deliverables.	Clarified. Basic points are substantiated by review of sample of evaluations.
170	ITC	216, Bullet 3	Corrections: replace "IMIS reporting" with "IMDIS reporting", and "…removed in October 2013" with "…removed in December 2012".	Yes, amended.

171	ITC	217	Correction: Change "…drafted but not yet been accepted by the SMC." to "…drafted but not yet formally presented for endorsement to the SMC."	Yes, amended to reflect this nuance.
172	ITC	220	Knowledge management tools: H drive and DocMan. Regarding the G drive and the H drive, please see comment under para 103.	Adjusted. ITC disagreement and Team experience both noted in Final Report.
173	ITC	221	For clarification purposes, include the following at the end of the paragraph: Knowledge management has also been one of the cornerstones of the intranet revitalization project, launched by the Communications Section as part of ITC's internal communications strategy. The plan for the new intranet, with knowledge management at its core, was approved by management in May 2013.	Noted in Final Report.
174	ITC	225	The cost transparency initiative was extended to the Communication and Events section in November 2013. Regarding bullet 3, Cost Transparency data continues to be updated and fed in to the RBM system.	This late bulletin has now been reflected in the Final Report
175	ITC	226	2013 BOA report is not available as yet so perhaps the reference is to the 2008-2009 BOA report. Saying that the 2009 report indicate a 'lack of progress made in the implementation of IPSAS' is misleading as it implies lack of progress in everything while the BOA report is with regards to 'assessing the impact of applying IPSAS on its administrative and accounting procedures.' The ITC response is that as ITC follows the UN financial regulations and rules, our procedures would be similar to those that the UN would be developing. The quoted finding on 'deficiencies in the year end automated processing of IMIS' again need review it implies that there is a problem. The reality is that the issue involved 3 obligations (one per year from 2005 to 2007) totalling around $4,000. These were caused by a bug in the IMIS system which did not allow the closing of the obligation in certain unusual circumstances. Other findings quoted in the paragraph have issues so we suggest that this paragraph be substantiated and revised. Also, OIOS conducts risk assessments to identify high risk areas to be included in its annual work plan. An OIOS internal risk assessment was prepared in November 2012 without consultation with ITC. OIOS also issued a risk assessment report on ITC in 2008.	Clarified. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation.
176	ITC	227	Substantiate: What are the rooms for improvement and would these areas be covered in UMOJA?	In the view of e.g. the BOA, there remains room for improvement, which can be achieved by addressing their recommendations now listed in the main report. If some remaining points are considered important enough, ITC can take them up in its management response to the Evaluation.

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177	ITC	228	". Travel – in advance of a new travel policy (2013), in 2012 …….., reportedly more than CHF 970'000 in 2012 66." the reason for achieving this amount is incorrectly stated. These savings correspond to several major efforts mainly a result of the negotiation on airfare with major carriers made jointly with all Geneva based Organizations (Please refer to the Annex to the report that explains it in details). This amount of savings is not the result of the newly advance purchase rule of 16 days in 2012. If you wish to keep this point please refer to the CSS report dated 31 October 2012 whereby a real time monitoring of the advance purchase allowed an assessment of the savings made over travel to the two major ITC events WEDF/WTPO. 154'000CHF savings were achieved due to earlier BUYING of tickets.	Amended.
178	Sweden	229 - 238	Relevance against strategic objectives is found to be high. At the same time country selection, project identification and selection and project needs assessment is found to be fair/poor. This appears potentially contradictory. How should it be interpreted?	This is repeated from comment 66. Please see that response.
179	ITC	234	Factual correction required: "…but no clear entry points had been yet defined." Evidence: In September 2013 the Senior Officer MDGs presented an 'Overview and Options for ITC Engagement in Post 2015'. Management decided ITC would seek to join the UN Task Team on the Post 2015 Development Agenda and the Technical Support Team of the General Assembly's Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. ITC was welcomed as a member of both by end 2013. The Senior Office then lead a Working Group on the Post 2015 Development Agenda to develop trade-related indicators as input into the Post 2015 process. As a result, as at April 2014, ITC's input is clearly visible in the language on trade that will be submitted by the Technical Support Team to Open Working Group (OWG)members for their first consideration of possible Pocus Areas and targets, at their 11th session taking place in May 2014. ITC ED took the floor at the 8th OWG meeting speaking in support of the economic empowerment of women through trade. The Co-chairs considered the meeting "an historic moment" in terms of the vigour and interest demonstrated by Member States who spoke overwhelming in support of women's empowerment. ITC is also a joint-organiser (with UNCTAD and WTO) of the 'Geneva Dialogues' on the Post 2015 Development Agenda that facilitates a multi-stakeholder dialogue on Post 2015.	Revised in Final Report.

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180	ITC	235	In terms of client needs: ITC has since 2007 conducted a client survey annually, with respondents numbering between 1000 (in 2011) and 2500 (in 2009). Although the representativeness of respondents and rigour of the assessment questions appear questionable (particularly in more recent years) MAR has taken over the ITC client needs survey to improve the methodology and rigour of the assessment compared to the private company which was in charge in the past. On which aspects the assessment appear questionable?	The Team knows from the experience with its own survey how difficult it can be to identify and engage many of ITC's clients. We studied and analysed all the client surveys, questions and reports, from 2007,2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. Throughout the period, with invitation numbers ranging from 25,000 to 78,000 contacts of various kinds, the response rates remained extremely low (3.2%-6%). In 2007 the survey posed 34 in-depth questions, closed and open-ended, covering multiple specific products, attributes and needs and must have been quite time-consuming and onerous to complete, but highly informative with informed respondents. At the other extreme, the 2011 survey included 18 questions of which the two most referred to called for superficial qualitative assessments of the Evolution of the overall quality of ITC's products since 2008, and the evolution of the performance of technical assistance since 2008. The overwhelmingly positive "results" were then duly cited for ITC's promotional purposes. In both the 2008 and 2011 surveys, the open-ended and option questions about needs for different services showed potential to be useful, given a reliable group of respondents. These experiences - which contrasted with the far more persuasively targeted survey of MAR tools - should be carefully analysed and taken into account in any future client survey work as well as in the design, management and use of the CRM system.
181	Sweden	239 - 248	It would be useful if the analysis of financial viability could be expanded, not the least considering the recommendation to increase funding (Section 2.4.4. primarily discusses the systems for fundraising, not the financial viability of the Centre per se). It would also be good to link it to the assessment of efficiency (which could also be expanded), alternative ways of generating revenue and overall strategy. (It is possibly outside the scope of this evaluation, but there is also the issue of unfunded liabilities for after service health insurance. This also needs to be taken into consideration in future discussions on financial viability).	Following up this comment, the Team received the references listed below on the health insurance liability question, but has not been in a position to carry out its own analysis and make an assessment on this specialized issue. A/68/353 Managing after-service health insurance liabilities, 27 August 2013; · A/68/550 Managing after-service health insurance liabilities, 25 October 2013; · A/68/689 Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 Report of the Fifth Committee, 30 December 2013; and · United Nations - ITC End-of-Service benefits Actuarial valuation as at 31 December 2013 from Ernst & Young Actuaires-Conseils, 17 April 2014.
182	ITC	240	Correction: 2012-2015 Strategic Plan (not just 2012)	Adjusted

183	ITC	248	Incomplete sentence 'Given the criticality of this role to ITC's future sustainability, resourcing level.' The head of external relations covers fundraising, and is secretary to all governance bodies: CCITF, JAG and SMC. Please see comment under para 74. There is a D1 regular budget funded post responsible for the P4, simply currently vacant.	Sentence adjusted. As noted earlier, the Evaluation has been mainly concerned with actual working capacity, to which vacant posts do not contribute. Moreover, even the approved posts are probably insufficient to carry out all these functions satisfactorily.
184	ITC	Table 5	Summary ratings on organization and management – "Fair" which can be understood as bad or below satisfactory. If that is the case, then the table is out of line with the narrative. The meaning of Fair should be better described for instance vis-à-vis other similar organizations. What is the benchmark?	No, the scale of "excellent, good, fair, poor and very poor" suggests that the "fair" rating is higher than "bad or unsatisfactory" which would clearly be rated as "poor" or ".very poor" on this scale. The criteria for these ratings have been listed and will be included in the methodological annex to the Final Report.
185	ITC ED	Table 5	Monitoring and evidence of results A. The rating Poor given for Project and programme management (B6) in your Organisation and Management section does not reflect our own assessment of the current 'fitness' of ITC for the following reasons: Monitoring and RBM systems Feedback from our partners B. Report of the 47th Session of the ITC Joint Advisory Group Meeting, paragraph 23, page 3: Statement by Mr. Pascal Lamy, DG, WTO: "The implementation of an agency-wide results-based management (RBM) system has refocused the delivery of ITC products on results in a manner that builds on an effective monitoring and evaluation construct. ITC has consistently highlighted the importance of demonstrating outcomes and impact while feeding project and programme analysis back into the project cycle to ensure more results focused interventions. RBM must continue to be anchored in the work of the ITC." Recent progress in improving our monitoring systems C. Similar to the point made above, ITC has been rated lower 'on paper', i.e. in the Organization and Management section on monitoring, evaluation and RBM than in its operations, i.e. in the Performance and Results section. We think that the key underlying issues identified in paragraph 144 are rather generic and should be further specified. More importantly, they are based on the summary of evaluations in 2012, which comprised only four projects/programmes. D. The large variety of projects and programmes at ITC make a simple monitoring framework rather difficult but with the introduction of Section logframes, ITC has, created a set of standardized indicators geared towards its technical expertise without undermining its organizational planning and monitoring responsibilities as mandated by UN rules and regulations. As of today, ITC is monitoring the development results it intends to achieve by using around 300 outcome and output indicators that cover different areas such as enterprise development, institutional strengthening and enhanced trade policies. The fact that results are now being measured in a standardized way and publicly	A. Correction: There is no composite rating given for Project and Programme Management, but a set of five more specific aspects, on which the current fitness ratings ranged from "Good" to "Very poor". The average was thus between poor and fair. On one of these five aspects, that of "Risk identification and mitigation", the Team has now taken into account the points made and evidence provided in the separate comment 144 and raised its rating from "very poor" to "poor", noting that an informal system has been functioning. The rating for project monitoring and evaluation systems was also reconsidered, but has been maintained, noting that the later, higher rating on the "quality and role of the evaluation system" points to a justified distinction. Otherwise, after careful consideration of these comments, the Evaluation maintains its assessments, primarily based on the solid evidence from several different streams that while major steps have been made in gearing up the relevant systems in ITC, particularly in the past couple of years, they are not yet solidly enough embedded to merit a higher rating. Para 144 is only part of the evidence for the point that change has happened only gradually in results reporting. It simply cites the findings from the summary of evaluations. Para 145 goes on to say that 'This Evaluation's own analyses point to a similar general finding, even keeping in perspective the limits of targeting and reporting results beyond the output level in all development cooperation work....' with specification and supporting evidence provided. B. ITC has certainly been attentive and assertive in its announcements and claims of management improvements and results achieved. It is not clear what the basis may be for the testimonials cited, but our more in-depth assessment is different, and our criteria for ratings are explicit and are being listed in the Methodological Annex to the Final Report. We accept that the intentions are there and that important progress has been made,

			available on ITC's website seems to merit a better rating than Poor.	especially in recent years, but the evidence was not there for the Evaluation that these improved systems were yet a full operational reality. Of course it is open to ITC's management response to further challenge and/or update these Evaluation results on the basis of evidence on "recent progress". C, With respect to the comment that " ITC has been rated lower 'on paper', i.e. in the Organization and Management section on monitoring, evaluation and RBM than in its operations, i.e. in the Performance and Results section", after review we have to agree that the aggregate rating (no. 5) in the Performance and results section was too high, looking at the lower ratings on its components. This is revised in the Final Report to "Poor/Fair" and will therefore be consistent with the relevant Organization and Management rating as well. D. Once again, these appear to be encouraging steps (especially the transparent approach), but for the Evaluation's coverage period the main advances are very recent and not yet proven to be useful and sustainable.
186	ITC ED	Table 5	Project identification and design We find that the rating Poor/Fair given for Project identification and design in your Organisation and Management section does not reflect our own assessment of the current 'fitness' of ITC for the following reasons: A. Inconsistency with your own ratings The related ratings that you give in the section on Performance and Results are: • Project identification and selection – Fair • Design processes and tools – Fair You described the assessment made in Table 2 on Organisation and Management as being more about ITC 'on paper' and the following assessment on Performance and Results as being more about the 'operational realities'. So scoring ITC as weaker on paper in this area than in reality seems inconsistent with other messages emerging from the report and our own sense of the reality. As you know ITC has instigated a number of thorough processes in this area in recent years. Not all of the projects that you examined in depth will have benefitted from the more rigorous approach. Given you agree that our direction of travel has been positive in all areas we would want to see this better reflected in the ratings. B. Inconsistency with auditor views A recent OIOS Audit of project management at ITC (report number 2013/067, issued 21 August 2013) reflected a more positive perspective, as for example, paragraph 5, page 1 states: "Over the life-cycle of the first generation of large projects (2008-2013), ITC initiated and developed, inter alia, the following internal procedures and	Some of the general responses to the comment 185 are also applicable here. More specifically: A. It is true that the PQAG, etc. processes have sought to improve the rigour of the design and approval processes. What is much less clear is the rationale and processes for the identification and selection of projects and countries, where the overwhelming evidence is that the ITC approach has been reactive and/or improvised based on unsystematic contacts or funding possibilities. On the other hand, we stand by the evidence for more positive ratings from our sample on the ground, In fact, there is no inconsistency between the two sets of ratings, or with the Evaluation's overall conclusions and recommendations. The point here is that from a systemic perspective the fitness was still not satisfactory ("fair") for the reasons above, while our limited sample of projects was actually somewhat better, with hardly any evidence of inappropriate or poorly designed projects actually on the ground . The most plausible explanation for the more positive sample reading is a wide open demand for ITC projects and good pragmatic competence by the operational experts setting up projects. B. We would not disagree with the auditor's acknowledgement of the formal systems and processes put in place (although we note at many points the further steps needed to apply them) but we stand

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| | | | practices needed to ensure effective project management and delivery: Results-Based Management (RBM) methodologies and tools; project manager and project team training on project management; an online customer relationship management tool; automation and integration of a corporate results reporting tool; an online Integrated Reporting Architecture to external stakeholders; a Country Needs Assessment methodology; quality assurance review procedures, bodies and personnel; corporate strategic planning and monitoring practices; and enhanced financial accountability through upgraded traceability of funds and financial management controls." It goes on to say Paragraph 15, page 2: "ITC […] established a satisfactory quality assurance mechanism for the project planning and development stages." Paragraph 23, page 6: "Adequate internal controls were in place for the quality assurance process for the project planning and development stages. […] ITC guidelines stated that quality assurance encompasses any activity that is concerned with assessing and improving the merit or the worth of a development intervention or its compliance with given standards. ITC established two committees, Project Quality Assurance Group (PQAG) and Project Appraisal Committee (PAC), respectively for peer review and quality control at the project planning and development stages to ensure that project ideas and project documents were aligned with the organization-wide requirements and standards. Project managers who benefitted from this two-tier system appreciated the added value of the peer review process. Internal controls for the management of the quality assurance process for the project planning and development stages were therefore considered satisfactory." C. One of the reasons why your rating of project identification and design differs from the view of the OIOS audit, as well our own perspective, may be that some of the most relevant reforms in this area have been carried out in the latter half of 2012. For example, the project design and quality assurance process has been thoroughly updated in July 2012 to improve the peer review process. Given the evaluation's period of review you might not have been exposed to projects that have gone through this new process. However, we think an objective comparison of the quality of ITC's TRTA projects in 2006 and today should indicate a significant improvement in the area of project identification and design. | by the overarching finding that they have not addressed the central issue of strategic selection of countries and projects.

C. Once again, if the contention is that that the Evaluation's evidence is out of date, the Management Response could address this with up-to-date evidence. |

| 187 | ITC ED | Table 5 | RBM
We would suggest revisiting the rating of Poor/Fair on 'RBM system and monitoring/reporting of results' (D1) in your section on Organisational and Management Issues. You have also rated ITC Poor/Fair in your section on Performance and Results under 'RBM, logframes and monitoring' (table 11, page 66). {Table 10 in Final} This has been an area of considerable improvement and I believe today's 'fitness' merits a higher rating for the following reasons:
Feedback from partners on our approach to RBM: We have developed our RBM approach based on the steer that we have received from our partner organisations and Member States, as well as good practice in this area. Most recently, our partner countries have expressed their appraisal through ITC's governing body, the Joint Advisory Group at its 47th in 2013 (all references from the report of the meeting):
Paragraph 23, page 3: Statement by Mr. Pascal Lamy, DG, WTO: "The implementation of an agency-wide results-based management (RBM) system has refocused the delivery of ITC products on results in a manner that builds on an effective monitoring and evaluation construct. ITC has consistently highlighted the importance of demonstrating outcomes and impact while feeding project and programme analysis back into the project cycle to ensure more results focused interventions. RBM must continue to be anchored in the work of the ITC."
Paragraph 84, page 11: General discussion:
"The JAG commended the organization for its sustained efforts to improve transparency and accountability. Delegations expressed appreciation for ITC's progress in implementing RBM throughout the organization, focusing on impact and outcomes, through an integrated and automated reporting architecture. They recognised ITC as a model of good practice in the implementation of RBM, welcomed the launch of ITC's Development Results Webpages and took note of ITC's commitment to go public in 2013."
Comments by Australia – Link
"Chair, we commend the emphasis ITC has placed on achieving, measuring, and reporting the results of its work. The achievements made by ITC in this area in recent years are truly noteworthy."
Canada - Link:
"We welcome the Annual Report's focus on showcasing development results from ITC's work by rolling out results-based management. Efforts on training, project quality assurance and evaluation are paying dividends, and ITC is a model of good practice in RBM in the field of trade capacity building."
Denmark – Link:
"The funding challenge is also linked to the results – and in this context, we would like to strongly commend ITC for the progress made in RBM." | Most of the issues raised here are addressed in the response to the comment 185. Once again, it is clear from the assembled testimonials that ITC has certainly built confidence among many key stakeholders by its efforts and progress in instituting RBM. Perhaps they are giving dominant weight to ITC's documented efforts and a recognition of the comparative weaknesses in many other agencies, neither of which we would contest.. But an independent Evaluation is expected to add different perspectives, methodology and criteria, which we have made explicit. The very clear theme in the Evaluation's findings, conclusions and recommendations around RBM is that "As in any other organisation moving to a results orientation, the balance now has to be found and shown where the system is demonstrably a useful set of tools for the whole organisation and its stakeholders, and not an expensive add-on or an end in itself. The burden of proof is on the designers of the system and on senior management in mandating its use." Of course it is open to ITC's management response to further challenge and/or update these Evaluation results on the basis of further evidence. |

			Netherlands - Link:	
			"We have confidence that ITC is setting the norm for the implementation of Results-based management. Project design will be more aligned with corporate objectives and ITC's indicators of achievement. I had a look at the beta version of the development results website. This site already gives an insight in ITC's results and will be further improved." Sweden - Link: "The change management "evolution" - to use her own term - she started has allowed ITC to come a long way in implementing results based management. In the competition for scarce donor resources, organisations that are able to accurately report outcome and impact have a distinct advantage."	
188	ITC	254	Clarify: Are expenditure figures (throughout the document) net or gross (i.e. do they include support costs)?	After a great deal of detailed effort, in picking through the ITC sources, all these references have now been clarified in the Final Report text, except where the sources simply never specified. In case there is any material issue remaining, the appropriate specialist at ITC is invited to get in touch with Saana's researcher for final clarification before publication.
189	ITC	259	W2 has a larger share of the XB funding, not W1. This is also stated later in the report, (para 379) i.e. the dominance of W2 (earmarked).	Corrected

190	ITC	Table 9	The change assessed column should be in text form not numbers according to the table above. Reference to some regression in areas of corporate efficiency and enhancing policy are not substantiated by the text, especially given the significant improvements made towards managing for results since 2006. In addition, The six categories listed under the column "Strategic Objectives" are not the three that were approved by UN New York in the 2012-2013 Programme Budget. The six categories, as identified in the 2012 Annual Report are "Development Results", while the three Strategic Objectives are: "Strengthened integration of the business sector into the global economy through enhanced support to policymakers"; "Increased capacity of trade support institutions to support businesses"; and "strengthened international competitiveness of enterprises through ITC training and support". This information is inconsistent with the three Strategic Objectives (which are correctly listed) in Figure 2 on page 10. To avoid confusion, change the column title from "Strategic Objectives" to "Development Results".	As explained above in the response to comment 30, Table 9 in the draft report has been eliminated, as has Table 18.
191	ITC	267-268	PCTP Ethical Fashion Initiative should be indicated in Inclusiveness and sustainability section as one of the large programmes as per ITC Consolidated Programme Document for 2011 (page 9): "PCTP links slum-based producer groups of fashion items to international value chains, ITC Ethical Fashion Initiative initially targets the urban poor in East and West Africa by adding value to cotton, leather products and waste materials, amongst others."	Amended to specify.
192	ITC	269	Re: "...some questioning in two of the countries as to whether this work was an area of comparative advantage for ITC": Please provide details to ascertain the reasons behind these minority views and present disaggregated information as to which stakeholders – the private or the public sector- were predominately expressing these views. It is extremely important for the programme to understand this difference as ITC is supporting only one aspect of the potential comprehensive technical assistance on WTO accession, that is, supporting the engagement of the private sector in WTO accession negotiations and preparing them to face the future realities of the global trading environment replete with new business opportunities and at the same time coping with enhanced competition in an open economy. It is quite evident from the responses received from four countries that 'enlightened stakeholders – in the public or the private sector – who want to reap benefits from WTO membership see the merit of such assistance and express satisfaction with technical assistance in this area. On the other hand, some stakeholders, especially in countries in which the public sector is reluctant to engage the private sector in the WTO accession process question ITC's comparative advantage in this area. Invariably these views are not shared by stakeholders in the private sector, who are direct beneficiaries of ITC's programme. That calls for detailed investigation by separately evaluating the views of different stakeholders in minority of countries where 'some	We cannot jeopardize confidentiality or pre-judge the motives of such respondents (found only in two cases) but the Final Report notes that private sector engagement in accession is an area were different and sometimes competing interests and perspectives can come into play.

			questioning' of ITC's comparative advantage in this area was noticed.	
193	ITC	270	Correction: Change '' The NTM programme, launched in 2011'' to ''launched in 2010…''. Also, there is no mention of the contributions of the Communications and Events Section. Propose to include the following sentence: The Communications Section has worked with other divisions and sections to promote awareness of ITC's technical assistance and advisory services, including on trade intelligence. Note also typo error: 'Global pubic goods'!	Error in date and typo corrected and a factual note added.
194	ITC	Table 11 + {Table 10 in Final} ES25, 27, 31, 278, 281)	The draft report contains some inconsistencies around ITC's project needs assessment and related rating. Overall, project needs assessment is rated as Poor. Yet the evaluation's findings both at the corporate level and on the ground do not seem to substantiate the rating: Paragraph ES25: The central conclusion of the Evaluation around ITC's results over the 2006-2012 period is that the Centre - in spite of limited resources and heavy external and internal constraints - has been able to continue providing high-quality services in its specialized field that are relevant and responsive, effective and relatively efficient. Paragraph 31: In terms of relevance, the lack of a continuing presence on the ground has reduced ITC's continuing visibility to potential clients and partners on the ground as well as its ability to follow national developments in its field closely and act on opportunities to contribute. In this regard the Centre has clearly been at a disadvantage both in relation to competing suppliers and in responding in a timely way to national needs and international A4T funding managed on the ground. On the other hand, it is a remarkable finding that in ITC's actual work on the ground over the period, in two sets of informed respondents only minorities assessed ITC's "country knowledge" negatively as a factor in meeting project objectives or its "up to date understanding of national and local conditions" as less than good. Some ITC geographic branch staff did signal concern on this. The Evaluation found few other significant examples of weakness in this regard. Beneficiaries and partners on the ground overwhelmingly knew who to deal with at ITC and how to contact them, and found the accessibility and support of ITC's technical specialists met project needs. Somehow, then, ITC's staff and consultants have continued to deliver in relevant and effective ways when called upon. Paragraph 278: Across the project portfolios, there is substantial evidence of beneficiary input in the identification and project selection stage with two-thirds of reporting projects confirming direct beneficiary input at that stage. In virtually all the cases studied, ITC experts and officials were involved at early stages. Across the country mission portfolio, there is no fixed pattern (and often different perspectives) on who took the initiative for projects. The evidence is that the	These comments are fully and consistently covered in the response to the comment 186.

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			initiative and initial impetus was generally quite evenly spread among ITC product sections, beneficiary requests and donors or came from a combination of the two or three categories of actors. Paragraph 281: In general, there is evidence of a diverse range of "needs assessments". They ranged from: specific pre-projects or phases in three countries examined (financed by the same sponsoring donor – State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland SECO); to matching specific needs identified by Diagnostic Trade Integrated Study (DTIS) or national export strategies in nine cases; extensive stakeholder consultations documented in several cases; to more focused consultations in virtually all the remainder. As will be seen in later sections – with the possible exception of the one sub-activity already noted in Ethiopia - the Evaluation did not encounter in its sample any cases where there was evidence or a strong suggestion of unneeded ITC projects. At the same time the level of priority for projects is less clear and the Evaluation sample included cases where sectoral activities selected were clearly agreed as high priorities and others where they were contested. "ITC projects required frequent coordination between technical and country units and among units of the same division in the implementation of project activities. Coordination allowed for synergic use of resources, avoided duplication and ensured consistency with the overall strategy of ITC. The mechanisms established by ITC were sufficient to ensure effective coordination from the early stages of the project development." (paragraph 27)	
195	ITC	273, Table 12	Clarify the use of the single asterisks () or remove.	One asterisk signifies "countries for missions" Inserted.
196	ITC	280	Text modification: A different type of exception was found in the case of the Ethical Fashion Initiative, where the initial project idea and business plan were brought to ITC by a fashion industry expert based on his identification of a market demand for ethical fashion ~~initiatives~~ products by the fashion industry.	Clarified
197	ITC	285	There is no conclusion to the points made – perhaps something like:" ITC should make an internal review of different methodologies and tools for needs assessment and programming and formulate a protocol for which ones may be most appropriate in different circumstances."	Paras. 285-288 present the evidence from the Evaluation's sample on ITC's approaches to needs assessment, and this section does not venture a conclusion. Such conclusions are integrated into the overall Conclusions section, in paras. 377-378
198	ITC	287, 292, 293	The Textile value chain in Tunisia is mentioned, it should be clearly stated that the project was in the design and development phase	Clarified
199	ITC	292	Lack of Consistency: Reference to Côte d'Ivoire should be consistent, change Ivory Coast and add circumflex to Cote d'Ivoire. Please ensure Côte d'Ivoire is used throughout the document.	Replaced

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200	ITC	294	Clarification required: What is stated is not correct for NTF II Senegal. The project took a proactive approach to cover cross-cutting issues particularly in relation to gender and poverty. The mango sector includes many small farmers and a large number of women at different stages of the value chain. Many women own parcels within cooperatives supported by the project. A total of 132 women participated in the training on good agricultural practices, and in training related to harvest practices and packaging. Specific training on processing of dried mango, juice and mango jam will be organised to help women add value to mangos that do not meet market requirements and increase their overall income. Correction required: We have been advised that the GA does not adopt the term "Arab Spring" (See Report of the Committee for Programme and Coordination A/67/16). As the report will be read in NY by the ACABQ the term be modified from "Arab Spring" to "the political situation in some Arab countries" (see recommendation 43 of A/67/16). Clarification required: ACCESS! for African Businesswomen in international trade has been implemented in 19 sub-Saharan countries in Africa and not only in Ethiopia, Senegal, ad Tanzania. However, Côte d'Ivoire has not benefitted from the programme. ACCESS! beneficiaries: in Western African region - Benin, Burkina-Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal; in Central African region - Cameroon, Chad, Congo, RDC; in Eastern and Southern African region - Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	Adjusted as needed.
201	ITC	304	Clarification required: Not correct for NTF II Senegal. ITC technical advisors provided the framework and the substantive content for conducting the activities; they provided guidance to the national experts in implementing the activity to achieve expected results.	Adjusted to avoid misunderstanding, but the point stands.
202	ITC	300 & 302	Para 300: Evidence for on-time project delivery across the mission countries is mixed: in Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire and Cambodia this was rated overall negatively. Para 302 Overall project management by ITC was on average ranked as "good" across the six countries examined. In Ethiopia, Senegal and Cambodia management and communication were considered satisfactory and budget delivery was timely. Clarification required: wording of these two statements re Cambodia seems somewhat contradictory	Noted small number of respondents
203	Finland	305 - 311	"Value for money" seemed to be difficult for the evaluation to assess but it would be very useful for a donor to have a clearer view on this topic.	Yes, "value for money" is extremely difficult to assess in development cooperation, particularly in areas like capacity-building through trade-related technical assistance. The ideal test would be a market one in which 1) the full cost of 2) the same services from different providers with 3) similar outcomes could be compared side by side, or 4) plausible costed alternatives can be compared. None of these four conditions for comparison can be met properly for most of ITC's products and services, so that the very imperfect measures of partner and other perceptions have to be relied upon, often based on anecdotal impressions of particular input costs for

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				individual projects, such as travel and consultancy fees. Noting, as the draft Report does, that none of this capacity building work is cheap in any absolute sense, the most practicable approach would appear to be for ITC's supporters to get the best sense possible of ITC's results achieved with an eye to those of other providers offering analogous or related services in comparable fields, and to evidence of concern and practices for economical operation. On the basis of the limited base for absolute and comparative assessment at this stage, the Evaluation's "view" would be that the value for money in ITC interventions compares quite favourably to plausible alternative options. If the major evaluation carried out on the Brussels-based Centre for the Development of Enterprise had been received in time, it might have been useful for some benchmarking purposes on issues such as overhead costs, and de-centralization, after careful consideration of the similarities and differences between the two organizations.
204	ITC	308	Clarification required: Not correct for NTF II Senegal. The Project document, annual workplan and progress reports detail the project budget and annual expenditures. These documents are produced and shared with the relevant partners (ASEPEX and Ministry of Trade). Also, re: "value for money" rated between poor and fair in Tunisia. Confirm which project this can be attributed in Tunisia. If it is linked to the Textile project and since implementation did not start, maybe the comment is not really relevant. The same with the comment on project spending on international overhead. This comment is contradictory to the one in para 309, where EnACT is described as seeking and using local consultants.	The evidence was reviewed and confirmed. Finding somewhat re-phrased.
205	ITC	311	Egypt marketing centre - Comment needs to be clarified.	Clarified in para 364 of final report.
206	ITC	312 & Table 15	The evidence of economic impact of ITC programmes is reported to be 23%. How did the evaluators arrive at a quantitative figure when the data is derived from qualitative sources (i.e. "HQ interviews and document review"). Please substantiate the percentages provided in Table 15. The reliability of these percentages is questionable, for example there is lack of coherence the finding concerning sustainability when compared to the rest of the text. If the title of the table is "Evidence of Impact", and throughout the document ITC is assessed as performing poorly on sustainability, yet according to this table perception of ITC's credible evidence on the project's sustainability is 42%. This figure is completely contradictory with the rest of the evaluation. Unless the data can be provided as a solid, reliable source, the table should be removed from the document.	This comment misinterprets the content and significance of Table 15. In fact, it simply reports on the responses to a direct question asked in HQ interviews and document review on whether there was evidence of projects' economic, social and environmental impacts and sustainable impacts. Thus it reports on numbers of perceptions, mainly l inked to the immediate effects of projects, where it would be strange indeed to conclude that there was none. This Table certainly does not convey any assessment by the Evaluation of impacts. It is true that the most striking difference between these perceptions and the Evaluation's conclusions lies around the issue of sustainability. Here the Evaluation's conclusions are based on overwhelming evidence that there is very little provision with ITC projects to ensure or even to know that there is any longer-term sustainability or development impact. Perhaps the more upbeat response to this question is best explained as answering simply

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				whether respondents' believed the project has left anything behind, which most surely would.
207	ITC	319	.."Apart from the projects targeted to women… such intended changes were judged not to have occurred in one project in Tunisia. In Tunisia, which is receiving much TRTA capacity building….ITC projects are too small in size…. " The two statements need to be substantiated: which projects are they referring to. Again if it is the Textile project which did not start, then the statement could be correct.	These are aggregate readings, not linked to individual projects,, which would also compromise confidentiality. After review of wide-ranging evidence, the drafting has been clarified.
208	ITC	323 & 324	Clarification required: What is the source of the feedback the related ratings?	These findings came from project questionnaires.
209	ITC	327	Clarification required: "regular and detailed reporting to mixed steering committees" The textile project in Tunisia is mentioned as part of the list and this is not correct, the project did not start, no Steering committee set up yet.	Corrected.
210	ITC	327	In the case of Cambodia, it should be clarified whether the statement refers to a particular project or is of general nature. Monitoring frameworks and project management structure have been shared with evaluators. They include monthly progress report from field-based PMU (including output tracking),regular steering committee meetings (twice a year), regular progress reports to various donors (UNDP, SECO, NZ-MAFT, EIF ES)with increased focus on outcome and even impact monitoring. In addition, results were measured with external mid-term reviews and evaluations. Clarification required: Re. NTF II Senegal, a project manager based in Geneva and a focal point based at ASEPEX managed the project during the entire period of implementation. ASPEX Staff and the focal point were trained on RBM and M&E. 2 Progress reports were produced annually. The project used mainly local consultants.	In the case of the Sector Wide Silk Projects it was not clear in Team interviews with ITC staff, beneficiaries and available documents how the results were monitored and measured. In the Midterm Evaluation report, there is information regarding project outputs achieved so far and in Project's Steering Committee Progress Report, there is information regarding the plan of activities and outputs status. In Senegal the reference was not to NTFI II in para 328, but another project not specified for confidentiality reasons.
211	ITC	329	Text modification: Going beyond conventional monitoring, the Ethical Fashion ~~programme~~ Initiative follows a rigorous Performance, Compliance, Monitoring and Evaluation protocol. This enables the initiative to monitor, evaluate and provide feedback on compliance with fair labour standards and the impact the Initiative has on people and the communities they live in.	This suggested statement, with the strong value judgements it contains, goes well beyond the assessment the Evaluation could support. We report it as a "claim" in the Final Report.
212	ITC	330	Clarification required: Re: "In Senegal … arrangements for follow up were considered poor or very poor". If this is in regard to the mango work under NTFII, CBI, the donor / partner has a project in process follow up on the work under NTF II as well as the EIF. Also, ASEPEX and Ministry of trade are	Clarified

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			supported by ITC to draft a Programme plan for Mango to be submitted to EIF.	
213	ITC ED	330 - 337 & Table 11 {Table 10 in Final}	Re: Sub-section of Follow-up assessments and evaluation, the draft report is mixing, unjustly, the ITC evaluation function and the project follow-up assessment (self-evaluation) in one broad term, which is not constructive for improving the two related but very distinctive functions. This part of the report is assessing only the follow up assessment, not the evaluation function; accordingly, the rating in Table 11 for "Follow-up assessment and evaluations" is a rating only for "follow-up assessment", not for evaluation. The current broad term is misleading, considering ITC evaluation function is not assessed in the related subsection. Besides, for enhancement in future, the performance of evaluation function needs a separate assessment and a clear rating indication in the Table 11. Therefore, it would be useful for ITC to clarify with separate analyses and ratings for "Follow-up assessment" and for "Evaluation function".	It is true that from the organizational perspective these two functions should be viewed separately although in terms of performance and results they are closely linked, as they were in the data-gathering. The Team has reviewed carefully and distinguished wherever possible in the Final Report, while remaining faithful to its evidence base.
214	ITC	333	Correction: The results of the follow-up project "Project development – capitalizing on the results from the AAACP Programme" included both development of the 10th EDF cotton project and a separate report drawing conclusions from the experience. Conclusions were disseminated in the final report and evaluation with the EU.	Revised
215	ITC	334	It has proved extremely difficult to obtain W1 funding for post-project relationship-building and next project development. The post AAACP request was reduced twice before being agreed at $45,000 ($37,350 net) mentioned in point 333 – several large projects that could have come to ITC in the Caribbean, Africa and Pacific were thus not pursued. In the case of two projects, one in Egypt and the second one in Tunisia, only the first phases (Phase 1) were completed, and there was no explanation for why a funded second phase was not carried out and funds returned to the donor, in the case of the Egypt's project. The explanation on why ITC could not go for a second phase is obvious and very often related to the availability of funds/approval of the implementation of the subsequent phases. In case of Egypt, under the Egyptian Marketing Centre, the deliverables were delivered with a saving of almost 10 percent of the project amount, a residual amount which (after request of the Egyptian counterparts and no response) were transferred to the ITC operating reserves. For Tunisia, the case of return of funds to donors should be substantiated.	Statement for Tunisia was misunderstood, since the "funds returned to donors" was referred exclusively to the Egypt project. Egypt case references further clarified.

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216	ITC	337	TEP carried out feedback on all its workshops during 2011-13 – please see donor reports. Clarification: Impact assessments are being done prior and after each order, not after workshops and seminars Text modification: Relatedly, In relation to larger projects examined, in PCTP Ethical Fashion Initiative, two nine seminar/workshops have been implemented on production, quality control and shipping so far in Haiti. 2 collections produced in partnerships with Osklen, Instituto-E and Chan Luu. Prior and after each order the Ethical Fashion Initiative conducted impact assessments to gather data on living standards, income, social problems, gender status, community health, sanitation, environmental problems, the ability to pay for medical expenses and children's education. Independent inspectors evaluated change as the result of workflow ensuring scientific rigour and objectivity. The data demonstrated impact on the lives of those involved in the Initiative, especially artisan women.	Some revisions have been made in the text, noting that a number of points in the comment were not documented on the Projects Portal or in several direct follow-ups by the Team, e.g. additional reports which make reference to the nine workshops/seminars. With regard to claims of "impact" from single export orders, the Team noted from the "Evaluation Chan Luu", if a positive impact has been detected at the social level the main impression that emerges is that this was nevertheless a small, short-term project, whose continuation is one of the most pressing concerns and hops of the participants. Regarding Medical and education expenses (p. 10): "one of the signature realities for the working poor in Haiti is that they are continually forced to use informal lending to meet basic needs. Thus, when short term jobs finish, a significant portion of the money will be earmarked to pay back money owing to local lenders."
217	ITC	342	Please clarify: It is unclear what the "cannot" refers to ("should not"? "are unable"?). It may be important to highlight the important role of country offices in ensuring coordination and the said synergies in large cross-sectional projects.	Clarified and expanded in the Final Report.
218	ITC	344	To be included: TEP had a constructive working relationship with PROMPERU and GIZ. Correction: EC, SC, TIS and TS are sections, not business lines.	Amended
219	ITC	346	Lack of consistency: "NTF …" please ensure NTF II is used throughout the document.	We have replaced "NTF" with "NTF II" throughout the report
220	Finland	346	There are some references to ITC vis-à-vis other AfT organisations in the text but the evaluation lacks an assessment of ITC's added value when comparing to other AfT organisations. This was one of the questions set out in ToR.	The Inception Report committed that "The recommendations, guidance and broader lessons emerging will draw on relevant models and benchmarking where possible and appropriate against other organizations with comparable features." Listed among the "Methods for analysis" in the Evaluation matrices was "Selective benchmarking as possible." These commitments were carried out. All evaluation questionnaires and other instruments included benchmarking questions and cues around relevant issues and as noted in para 368 of the draft report: "In response to a question as to whether ITC had proved the best agency to provide the services required, almost all project questionnaires identified the project fitting into ITC's comparative advantage compared to other TRTA providers." This was followed by a some broad findings and a dozen more specific examples. As mentioned, the working papers on the country missions (and on the portfolio reviews) included all the results collected. As stated in para. 368 as well "Overall, the Evaluation's did not get an adequate sample of rated responses explicitly assessing ITC's relative performance in trade Intelligence; support to policy makers, strengthening TSIs; and support for SME exporters to support quantified findings on that score." In fact, some lack of response on

| | | | | these points may relate to the fact that some of ITC's activities are unique, as well as the limited comparable engagement of different agencies in particular countries. "All of the mission analyses and a large majority of project reviews reports on balance ranked technical expertise as a particular strength of ITC." Other fairly broad comparative findings included a high rating for ITC's ability to work with SMEs, and for respectful and sensitive technical assistance. Beyond these findings, the Report's section 2.1.3 on "ITC's Place and prospects in global Aid for Trade" provides considerable further benchmarking information, including a summary section in Para. 38.

Another possible comparator, although not so exclusively focused on trade, is the Brussels-based Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) created in 1977 as an a joint ACP institution to promote private sector development. Knowing that there may be lessons to be drawn from CDE's experience for possible benchmarking purposes the Evaluation Team made numerous requests over more than two months to obtain a copy of a substantial evaluation carried out in 2011 for the EU on the CDE, which had a number of comparable services to the ITC. CDE ultimately denied the request, describing it as an internal document, and the EC provided a copy two days before the submission of this Final Report. A quick scan of the report indeed suggests some interesting comparisons and contrasts in the ways in which these two institutions have worked to grapple with some comparable challenges. If the evaluation had been received in time, it might have been useful for some benchmarking purposes on issues such as overhead cost, the relative focus on activities and results, and de-centralization, after careful consideration of the similarities and differences between the two organizations. See Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, Final Report, Volume I: Main Report, September 2011, Evaluation for the European Commission by ADE Consortium. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **221** | ITC | 349 | To be included: TEP partnered closely with GIZ in Peru and ensured a dovetailed approach on supporting the effective trade promotion of biodiversity based products. | Reflected in final report. |
| **222** | ITC | Section 3.4.7 | To be included: No reference has been made to e-learning made. Although relatively new, e-learning could have been given some consideration, for example under section 3.4.7, as a useful innovation. | The Evaluation had no evidence on this issue; it did not come up during enquiry |
| **223** | ITC | 353 | To be included: Whilst the AAACP Programme innovative approach is praised as a way for ITC to work on joint activities – this point does not find its way into | The references are clear here, among a good many other "Notable accomplishments in sample projects, innovations, etc." |

			any of the conclusions.	
224	ITC	364	Egypt marketing centre - Comment needs to be clarified.	Clarified
225	ITC	366	Clarification required: DRC is mentioned several times but there is no reference to a particular project or Programme – there were several in the reporting period. To be included: Uganda NTF II "…not allowing carrying over…" this is something identified in a previous review and subsequently corrected under NTF III. It should be an example of a lesson learned and corrected. Substantiate: "Tunisia ensure availability of funds to implement follow-up Phase II." If this statement refers to the agro-food project, phase II is actually launched and will be implemented by UNIDO	On DRC as other countries, in most cases references are not made here to specific projects, for confidentiality reasons, but these points were supported by several specific instances. NTF III starts in 2014 and therefore is not under the Evaluation timeframe.. If justified, this lessons learned would be appropriately cited in a management response. Tunisia notes are revised.
226	ITC	367	Substantiate or clarify: Bangladesh "…institution" is this referring to leather? Text modification: PCTP Ethical Fashion Initiative: In addition to in-kind contribution by the industry partners from the outset, it could have been beneficial to involve them in a fair labour framework and engage non-traditional funding partners through private sector investors. Substantiate: "Tunisia: focus on national/regional expertise..." As in most cases local expertise has been used in projects in Tunisia.	Bangladesh clarified. On PCTP and Tunisia, these are reports of direct suggestions from informants, not to be reformulated by ITC.
227	ITC	368	"deepening links with national/local beneficiaries and stakeholders (Tunisia). Comment need to be substantiated, a preceding comment mentioned that the TSI in Tunisia actually implement the ITC method to diversify markets?	These are considered findings, based on several distinct streams of evidence. In particular, in the case of Tunisia this key lesson was drawn on the basis of the comments of many of the interviewed respondents, following their perception that ITC in the country works almost exclusively with the MoT and does not engage enough with the private sector and TSIs. It was further recommended that ITC should consider developing a country strategy in full cooperation with major stakeholders, in primis the private sector, with defined areas/sectors of intervention and discuss it with other agencies/donors to define areas of cooperation. Likely, ITC should work more on the transfer of know-how to beneficiaries and local consultants.
228	ITC	374 & Table 18	Please rectify or make coherent: Despite the user warnings in paragraph 374, indicative arrogated ratings in Table 18 are seen to be misleading in the case of efficiency. The paragraphs after the table do not corroborate the "low" assessment on efficiency. Furthermore, the rating of efficiency as "low" is not supported in the text which continually describes ITC as relatively efficient (e.g. para 381).	As explained above in the response to comment no. 30, Table 18 in the draft report has been eliminated, as has Table 9.
229	ITC	376	"employing more than 50…" this is arbitrary. Most of the projects looked very similar. Were this a larger institutions, these would all be grouped under one heading and be called coherent.	No. The Team stands firmly by its findings and conclusions in regard to the number of ITC product lines and services exceeding 50 and not all being clearly defined or widely understood ,as is well-known within ITC. The defensive comparison to larger organizations is odd, surely a smaller organization has even more need to clarify

				its business.
230	ITC	381 - 390	Coherence required between text and conclusions: The key challenges identified for ITC to demonstrate reliable results should be specifically reflected in the conclusions, as follows: a) Inconsistent alignment of individual programmes to the corporate objectives; b) Weak RBM (goal setting at impact level, building reliable theory of change, and cross-function knowledge sharing); c) Inadequate project management system regarding risk management, local partnership, monitoring and reporting results, and self-evaluation; d) Across-board weak sustainability and exit strategies of ITC interventions; e) Unclear institutional setting for evaluation function in terms of applying UNEG and OIOS standards and good practices; and f) Lack of corporate approaches to addressing cross-cutting issues: poverty reduction, gender, youth, environment and climate change. The same applies to Section 4 of the Executive Summary.	The points on coherence are noted and reflected in the Final Report, although the Team must determine its own conclusions on key challenges.
231	Switzerla nd	385	You have stated that the evidence base for the ratings of the performance since 2006 was between "low" and "medium". - Can you assess if the steps of ITC toward an improved RBM system would allow in the future to have a better evidence base to answer this question? - Is the evidence base also so weak for projects / programs that underwent previously a project evaluation and to what extend could you use those evaluations at project level in this overall assessment of ITC?	Yes, the Evaluation's assessment is that the steps of ITC toward an improved RBM system are likely to allow a steadily stronger evidence base in future to answer questions about performance. No, the evidence base is generally stronger for projects / programs that have previously undergone a project or programme evaluation and those evaluations have contributed significantly in this overall assessment of ITC?
232	Switzerla nd	391 - 399	You mention the vicious circle and the unsustainable situation. Your conclusion is that higher, longer-term ad less-earmarked funding is required. Donors need to be convinced by the PCM and the achieved results before providing more substantial funding and to note that ITC best practices will be adopted inside the house. Under the premise to look out for alternatives and not only focusing in increased funding to overcome the unsustainable situation, could it also be a way forward that ITC reduces its focus, e.g. by adjusting the strategic objectives or tighter selection of beneficiary countries ?	As stressed in para. 383, the Evaluation does not suggest that the required improvements will ever be simple or resolved just by ITC's financial supporters. Paras. 381-383 and the recommendations themselves set out a path to a "virtuous circle" in which clearer strategic direction from ITC, combined with continuing the improvements in management already well underway, would allow for the Centre to effectively respond to the evident wider demand with excellent products and services. As indicated in the response to the questions immediately above, the Evaluation does not suggest that ITC growth needs to be delayed pending further management improvements, but that further reforms and growth should be "staged and phased to existing and developing capacities to avoid overload and constant improvisation." In the event that existing and potential donor confidence were not sufficient to generate the funding growth envisaged, not only would it mean that evident priority needs for proven ITC services would go unmet, but it is also very hard to find any justifiable rationale for a way forward by ITC reducing its focus. The strategic objectives and proposed programme clusters are all demonstrably of high relevance in AfT, and not properly served by

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				other suppliers. ITC's current and recent "selection" of beneficiary countries is already too narrow, dictated by its limited means, Both in terms of real needs in trade-related technical assistance, and ITC's mission as a UN institution, the Evaluation sees no defensible rationale for further narrowing its clientele by income group or region.
233	ITC	Table 19	Substantiate: "follow-up assessments and evaluations … very poor … no progress".	Refined in Final Report
234	ITC ED	400 - 401 + ES38	Recommendation 1 does not take into account the broader trends in A4T and TRTA in particular. ES38. Recommendation 1: Move to a strategic base for supporting and deploying ITC's unique strengths in the global Aid for Trade effort. The six clustered focus areas in the current ITC Operational Plan and Case for Support should be provided with substantial longer-term financial support (5 year minimum) and should developed and deployed by ITC in genuinely strategic ways for a wide range of countries and regions. De-emphasize ambitions for conventional country programmes, in favour of capitalizing on proven ITC strengths globally and regionally. As I explained during our telephone conversation, the ITC is not really in the area of devising country programmes as the World Bank or the IMF would. It is clear, nevertheless, that our interventions are in-country and we do consider this dimension very carefully to ensure there is coherence and consistency in our intervention to ensure unnecessary in-country overlaps. Over the last years, the industry has seen a strong push towards country ownership particularly related to programming and delivering development assistance. With the debate on aid effectiveness principles from Paris to Busan comes a growing emphasis on in-country programming, coherence with UN-wide assistance framework/ programmes and country ownership. Availability of TRTA funding continues to be predominantly channelled to country and regional projects – even if it's in the framework of larger programmes. ITC – as a UN member – needs to work with these processes. Also, this trend becomes more important not just from a co-ordination and coherence perspective (UNDAF/ UNDAP/OneUN) but also in view of the post-MDG agenda. As economic development (including trade and SME development) will be part of the new agenda it will play a larger role for shaping UN assistance at the country level. I thought I would raise this issue in the hope that you are able to clarify your comments on country in the final report.	The Team does not agree that this Recommendation fails to take into account the broader trends in A4T and TRTA and does not see any conflict of substance with what is said in this comment . The Team is deeply grounded in both the policy intent and the practical realities of the push towards country ownership related to programming and delivering coordinated and harmonised development assistance and UN-wide assistance framework/ programmes. As stated in other responses, the recommendation recognises that TRTA (and ITC) funding will continues to be predominantly channelled through country and regional projects, but that does not mean that ITC should attempt to develop full-service country programming of its own, which would anyway be beyond its capacities in any but a few countries. Instead, the recommended focus on maintaining and strengthening ITC's specialized products and services should best place ITC to offer its contributions in trade and SME development globally and as part of a wide range of regional and country programmes deployed by and with other agencies and funders under the post-MDG agenda. The potential is clear from ITC's record in its voluntary-funded regional and thematic projects, as well as in implementing EIF and SDTF activities. To date, the evidence suggests that the UNDAF/ UNDAP/OneUN frameworks have not called upon ITC as much as they should, but hopefully the more influential UN actors can become more sensitized to the importance of TRTA and to what ITC has to offer. The Final Report text has been reviewed to ensure that these messages are as clear as possible.

235	UNCTAD	405 - 406	The recommendation suggests, inter alia, that: "ITC management should also be assertive in making and defending adjustments and adaptations to standardized UN requirements that are necessary to accommodate its distinctive mission and essential business requirements." And similarly to "ITC's governors and Supporters" : "Engaged Members should be prepared to support necessary adjustments or adaptations in standardized UN requirements to accommodate a smaller, more entrepreneurial, private sector-oriented organization like ITC". Any agency within the UN system is obliged to adhere to the regulations and rules governing finances, human resources, etc. If UN rules are such a hurdle for the ITC, then the agency needs to take a decisive step like the Global Fund did and sever its link with the UN rather than ask for special treatment on the premise of its uniqueness. However, this again has implications for the viability and sustainability of the institution, and links back to the question of clearly establishing what ITC's identity is.	It should be stressed - as is clear in other comments in this list from the ITC administration - that the findings, conclusions and recommendations on the need for greater flexibility in applying UN systems and practices to ITC are not based on any complaints from ITC's senior administrative staff. Instead they are the independent assessments of the Evaluation Team, based on its evidence about how the ITC could further optimize its performance. The UNCTAD observations are available to all stakeholders here.
236	ITC	406	Could the report be revised to add XB or RB whenever the word "budget" is used? It will make a very big difference to the readers in NY UN Context. The CCITF is an advisory committee to the ITC Trust Fund (XB) they do not have a formal role in the regular budget discussion which is under the authority of the UN ACABQ, Fifth Committee and the GA and the WTO CBFA and the WTO General Counsel. Yes ITC likes to keep the CCITF informed as the XB operates in the context of the RB funding but they do not play an advisory authoritative role for the regular budget. I recommend keeping the descriptions of the roles very clear. If you refer to the Programme Budget (RB) and next add a comment about use and deployment of a "budget" without adding XB or Trust Funds it will be very confusing. Also, if member states are truly supportive, could the evaluation ask the question about member states contributing more regular budget i.e., assessed contributions to ITC not just XB. Assessed contributions have all the characteristics ITC needs, sustainability, reliability, multi-year, un-earmarked etc. ITC is an anomaly in the UN system as its programmes are almost exclusively funded by XB rather than regular budget funds.	We do not intend to do this for 136 references on some of which it does not apply. This has been clarified as necessary in the Final Report. On the final point, it would be interesting and important if ITC can substantiate the assertion that " ITC is an anomaly in the UN system as its programmes are almost exclusively funded by XB rather than regular budget funds." Our scan of relevant research suggests that for 1996-2003, funding shares to the UN system for development cooperation, (excl. WFP) averaged. 60.1% in supplementary resources; 36.9% in core. See: http://shiftingwealth.blogspot.ca/2012/10/on-voluntary-funding-of-multilateral-aid.html http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/Funding_for_United_Nations_Development_Cooperation.pdf (see pp 9, 10, 13)
237	WTO	section 4.4 - recs	I think the report should have focused greater deal on ITCs technical products and services (by far ITC's best working assets) and may be on greater use of online means to ensure their distribution and usage in client countries.	The Team has no disagreement with this point, and in fact makes it strongly itself, both in the detailed findings and the conclusions and recommendations.
238	WTO	section 4.4 - recs	There seems to be no recommendations for some bottom up process where staff of ITC could embark on some strategic discussion on how their organization could function better. This might prove useful before going into intergovernmental discussions. It would certainly have great sense of belonging and inclusiveness.	The Team would agree that this will be an important part of the further strengthening of the organization and its performance, as the way ahead is clarified in the light of this Evaluation, the management response and consultations with ITC's members, governors and supporters. The Evaluation did not follow the example of the 2006 Evaluation in attempting to prescribe specific processes for engaging ITC's skilled and committed workforce in

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				the next phases, as management and staff representatives will undoubtedly want to take account of lessons to be learned from the earlier period.
239	WTO	section 4.4 - recs	As far as governance and strategic direction is concerned, ITC can benefit from Parent organizations orientations as well as synergies on the A4T for example. One of the recommendations could be to revert to the past practice of an annual meeting of the three Heads of ITC UNCTAD and WTO and their close collaborators, in preference well in advance of JAG meetings.	This suggestion is fully consistent with the Evaluation's conclusions and will be added as a specific recommendation.

Examples of overhead costs in ITC projects

Project / Source of evidence / Expenditure Categories	Exp.	Project / Source of evidence / Expenditure Categories	Exp.
TCCEP / MTR 2012		**PCTP Kenya / MTR 2013**	
ITC staff costs (A)	30%	ITC advisers (A)	45%
ITC support costs (B)	12%	International consultants (B)	10%
TSI-based training and other activities	21%	administrative support personnel (C)	6%
International consultants, incl. TA (C)	17%	travel by personnel (D)	11%
National consultants, incl. TA	12%	travel by headquarter staff (E)	2%
Project travel (D)	8%	national experts	2%
A+B+C+D / total expenditure	**67%**	**A+B+C+D+E / total expenditure**	74%
NTF II / Evaluation 2013		**Trade Promotion - Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan / Final Evaluation 2008**	
Salaries of the ITC advisors (A)	13%	"In the process of evaluation the issue of employing highly rated foreign experts from all over the world (high fees, high transportation costs) was repeatedly questioned. The success of the project is very closely linked to the high quality of foreign expertise, therefore even if their inputs were not cheap; they were certainly worth being employed, due to the outstanding VfM quality of their expertise."	
Fees for International consultants (B)	23%		
Fees for national consultants	14%		
A+B / total expenditure	**36%**		
PACT II / MTR 2011		**Silk Sector Projects / MTR 2011**	
ITC Support costs (A)	13%	In total, less than 50 % of the allocated budget is targeting the field work and the rest is there for coordinating activities, administration, overheads, etc.	
PCU estimation of ITC staff costs (overheads) since programme inception (2008) and projected to Dec 2011 (B)	31%	The type work which was carried out by the project is expensive by definition. Export orientation, or generally improvement of quality of production, in a value chain where the level of skills is identified as a serious bottleneck, means that the efforts to increase the quality will be very involving	
International + national consultants (C)	11%	Direct interventions on weavers level is not a cheap method of value chain improvement, but there are no alternatives to produce quality improvement. Looking at the number of people trained, the efforts seemed to have been costly. But that is not an issue of the quality of project work; it is more due to the nature of intervention.	
A+B+C (excluding national consultants) / total expenditure	**50%**		
"In future similar programs, due to differences in requirements and partner capacity, ITC will also need to be able to provide more efficient management and higher value and better tailored services to remain with a significant role and budget share."			

Categories of interview respondents (by Country Mission)

Respondents interviewed by Country Mission / Category	Cambodia	Côte d'Ivoire	Ethiopia	Senegal	Tanzania	Tunisia	Total Country Missions	Haiti	Uruguay	Total Virtual Country Missions	Grand Total
Government	4	13	2	9	9	8	45	-	2	2	47
TSIs	-	8	3	2	7	4	24	3	2	5	29
Private sector (enterprises / workers)	13	1	-	10	-	-	24	-	-	-	24
Private sector (business associations)	2	-	1	2	5	-	10	-	-	-	10
Civil society	1	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	3
Donors / Development partners / I/Os	3	2	7	2	1	15	30	1	-	1	31
Consultants	5	8	3	1	-	6	23	2	1	3	26
ITC Staff	-	3	-	-	3	-	6	4	5	9	15
Total	28	35	16	26	25	35	165	10	10	20	185

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Categories of interview respondents (country missions)

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